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ARTICLES
The Constitutionality of State and Local
"Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries:
Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or a
Sorry State of Affairs?
by BRANNON P. DENNING* & JACK H. MCCALL, JR.**
"If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other nations."
-The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison)'
Introduction
In the 1980s, a number of state and local governments imposed
restrictions on procurement from and investment in companies doing
business in South Africa, as a way to declare their abhorrence of that
nation's apartheid regime.2 About the same time, other municipalities
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1. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (James Madison) (Random House) [hereinafter
THE FEDERALIST].
2. See, e.g., Grace A. Jubinsky, Note, State and Municipal Governments React Against
South African Apartheid. An Assessment of the Constitutionality of the Divestment Cam-
paign, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 543 (1985); Kevin P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The
Constitutionality of State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TuL. L. REv. 469 (1987);
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passed ordinances and charter amendments declaring themselves to
be "nuclear free" zones in which both "the manufacture and deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons" were prohibited. These examples of state
and local involvement in foreign policy drew comment4 and court
challenge5 at the time and have, in the late 1990s, served as models for
a more sweeping series of state and local procurement and divestment
laws aimed at companies doing business with countries like Myanmar
(formerly Burma), China, Cuba, Indonesia, Nigeria, and even Switzer-
land.6 This latest round of what one foreign policy expert has called
"the democratization of foreign policy run amok"7 has produced vig-
orous criticism from various experts, trade groups,8 and members of
the State Department.9
Lori A. Martin, Comment, The Legality of Nuclear Free Zones, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 965, 966
(1988); Peter J. Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon
the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813 (1986).
3. Martin, supra note 2, at 966 (footnote omitted)(suggesting constitutional problems
with nuclear free zones); see also Fossella v. Dinkins, 488 N.E.2d 117 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985), affd, 485 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985) (striking down early 1980s New York City "nu-
clear-free zone" enactment).
4. See supra note 2.
5. See Board of Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md.
1989) (upholding ordinance requiring trustees of pension fund to divest holdings of compa-
nies doing business in South Africa), cert. denied sub nom. Lubman v. Mayor & City Coun-
cil of Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503
N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986); New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human
Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977).
6. Many cities and states.., now have their own sanctions. Chicago and New
York are considering divesting their pension funds from Switzerland because of
the Swiss banks' treatment of Holocaust accounts. Takoma Park, Maryland, boy-
cotts Burmese goods because of human rights violations. Heavily Cuban-Ameri-
can Dade County, Florida, has a selective purchasing and investment law against
Cuba.
Jacob Heilbrunn, The Sanctions Sellout, TiH NEw REPUBLIc, May 25, 1998, at 21, 24. See
also Fred Hiatt, Massachusetts Takes on Burma, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1999, at B7; David
Cay Johnston, Two States Outline Sanctions on Swiss Banks in Holocaust Case, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 1998, at AS; Warren Richey, Using Boycotts to Punish Nations, CIsT'AN SCe.
MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1998, at 3; USA*ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Watch List (last
visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http:llusaengage.orglnews/status.html>; infra notes 26-48 and accom-
panying text.
7. Paul Blustein, Thinking Globally, Punishing Locally, WASH. POST, May 16, 1997,
at G1, G2 (quoting Richard N. Haass, director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings
Institute).
8. See, e.g., Kimberly Ann Elliott, Backing Illegal Sanctions, J. COM., Aug. 6, 1997, at
8A, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws fie; see also Testimony of Todd M. Malan,
Executive Director, Organization for International Investmen4 before the California Assem-
bly Committee on International Trade and Development, Oct. 28, 1997 (last visited Nov. 4,
1998) <http:llwww.usaengage.org/legislative/malan.html> [hereinafter Malan Testimony].
9. See, e.g., Reuters, U.S. Opposes Holocaust Suits But Says It Can't Stop Them, USA
TODAY, July 7, 1998, at 9A; Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade
More importantly, one recent measure - a Massachusetts law
barring state contracts with companies that do business in Myanmar' °
- was sucessfully challenged in federal district court in Boston as an
unconstitutional state interference with the federal government's for-
eign affairs power." The outcome of the suit has implications not
only for the state and local sanctions imposed against Myanmar in
other jurisdictions,' 2 but also those sanctions either enacted or under
consideration elsewhere that target other countries.'
3
Despite the laudable motives with which many of these statutes
and ordinances are introduced and the loathsomeness of many re-
gimes against which such sanctions are enacted, the constitutionality
of these measures is hotly disputed. Opponents claim that such sanc-
tions unconstitutionally usurp the federal government's prerogative to
conduct foreign affairs as it sees fit; they argue that decisions whether
and when to levy sanctions should be properly made by the federal,
not a state or local, government. 4 The authors of one recent article'"
Sanctions, Troubling Business Groups and U.S. Trade Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998,
at A-20; Robert E. Pierre, Md. Bill Targeting Nigeria Stirs Ire, State Dept. Opposes Sanc-
tions Proposal, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1998, at B1, B4 (describing State Department lobby-
ing of "state and city officials nationwide to leave foreign policy decisions to them"); David
E. Sanger, McCall and State Dept. Clash on Sanctions Against Swiss Over Gold, N.Y.
Tirms, July 23, 1998, at B1, B2; see also USA*ENGAGE, Testimony of Deputy Assistant
Secretary David Marchick Before the Maryland House of Delegates Committee on Com-
merce and Government Matters, Mar. 25, 1998 (last visited Nov. 4, 1998) <http://
www.usaengage.org/legislative/marchick.html> [hereinafter Marchick Testimony].
10. MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 7 §§ 22G-22J (West 1998 Supp.). For a discussion of
Massachusetts' law, see infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
11. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998).
For a discussion of the Baker case, see infra notes 132-47 and accompanying text. See also
Martin Crutsinger, Suit Attacks State Law Penalizing Business with Myanmar, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 1, 1998, at E7; Evelyn Iritani, Suit Challenges Myanmar Trade Ban, L.A.
TiMEs, May 1, 1998, at D1, D10.
12. See Iritani, supra note 11, at D1 ("The suit.., has direct implications for similar
laws in effect in Santa Monica, San Francisco, Berkeley and Oakland aimed at Myanmar
investors. The city of Los Angeles is considering such a measure."); Michael S. Lelyveld,
Ruling on Sanctions Proves No Deterrent, J. COM., Dec. 28, 1998, at 1A (describing Los
Angeles' decision to keep its sanctions in place despite the Baker ruling); Bonnie
Rochman, 2 Towns, 2 Takes on Burma, THE NEws AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Feb. 6,
1999, at B5 (describing debate in Carrboro, North Carolina whether to repeal sanctions
against Myanmar, in light of the Baker decision); Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The
Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 443-
44 & n.3 (1998). Price and Hannah's article appeared in publication as our article was
being finalized.
13. See USA*ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Watch List, supra note 6 (citing list
of pending sanctions).
14. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 8, LEXIS at 1; Marchick Testimony, supra note 9, at 2-
4; Robert P. O'Quinn, A User's Guide to Economic Sanctions (June 25, 1997) (last visited
Nov. 4, 1998 <http://usaengage.org/studies/users.html> (arguing that state and local sanc-
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conclude that state and local sanctions intrude on the power of the
federal government to regulate foreign commerce,' 6 violate the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 17 and hinder the ability of the
federal government to conduct foreign policy.18
Supporters of these subnational-level sanctions, like Massachu-
setts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger, respond that state and lo-
cal governments have a role to play in the vindication of human rights
worldwide and that they may do so constitutionally by exercising their
power of the purse.19 Supporters continue to argue in court, as was
claimed with the previous sanctions directed against South Africa,
that when state and local governments are acting as "participants"
rather than "regulators" in the marketplace, the usual strictures of the
Commerce Clause should not apply. °
We argue that these state and local sanctions violate the Constitu-
tion in at least two ways. First, the state and local governments' in-
volvement in foreign affairs through such sanctions violates the
structural allocation of power in the Constitution that assigns plenary
responsibility for foreign affairs to the federal government.2' Second,
the state and local sanctions impermissibly burden foreign commerce
by both discriminating against foreign commerce and by inhibiting the
tions introduce "incoherence and disunity" into foreign policy); Steven Spear, 50 Different
Departments of State, THE EXPORT PRACTrrIONER (July 1997) (last visited Nov. 4, 1998)
<http://usaengage.org/news/97julyep.html>.
15. See David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local
Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAMP.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (reserving to Congress the power to regulate com-
merce "with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes");
Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 189-98.
17. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring the Constitution, all laws of the United
States "made in Pursuance thereof" and all treaties made under the authority of the
United States to be the "supreme Law of the Land"); Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15,
at 198-99.
18. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (providing Congress with the power to define and
punish acts of piracy and felonies on the high seas and "Offences against the Law of Na-
tions"); Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 202-07.
19. See, e.g., Iritani, supra note 11, at D2 (quoting Massachusetts Attorney General
Harshbarger: "Massachusetts should play a role in trying to improve the human rights of
the people of Burma, and I believe that the Constitution allows us to do so."). See gener-
ally Alejandra Carvajal, Note, State and Local "Free Burma" Laws: The Case for Sub-
National Trade Sanctions, 29 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, Hearing
Voices on the World Stage, LEGAL Tuvms, Dec. 14, 1998, at 25.
20. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 51-129 and accompanying text.
ability of the federal government to present a unified trade policy and
make centralized decisions regarding sanctions.22
In addition, we argue that courts should reject the claims of mu-
nicipalities and states that they are exempt from the strictures of the
Foreign Commerce Clause because of the "market-participant" excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. That exception,
which has heretofore been applied solely in interstate commerce
cases, is not easily adapted to the realm of foreign commerce. In any
event, assuming arguendo that the market-participant exception does
apply to foreign commerce, many of the enacted or proposed state
and local sanctions attempt to impose limits that far exceed those al-
lowed under existing case law. 3
I. State and Local Sanctions: An Overview
Because subnational governments cannot directly initiate boy-
cotts or impose export controls like the federal government can,24 the
term "sanctions," as used to describe recent state and local enact-
ments, is somewhat of a misnomer. We use it throughout this article,
however, not only for the sake of convenience, but also because the
term accurately describes the indirect aims of these measures.
A recent policy analysis offered the following taxonomy of the
"secondary boycotts" used by states and cities:
(1) procurement restrictions... bar any company that does
business in a target country from supplying good and services to
the state or locality and (2) investment restrictions... prevent a
state or locality from investing public funds in or lending public
funds to any company that does business in a target country.
[Both] attempt to force companies to choose between doing
business with the state or local government or doing business in
the target country?5
22. See infra notes 158-208 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 223-92 and accompanying text.
24. See also Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83
Am. J. INT'L L. 821, 830-31 (1989) (noting constitutional prohibitions on state-initiated
embargoes and boycotts). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 2 (prohibiting states
from laying imposts or duties on imports and exports without congressional consent); Ex-
port Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2401 et seq. (West 1991 & Supp. 1998)
(enacting federal export controls for reasons of national security, foreign policy and preser-
vation of scarce supplies and resources); id. § 2407 (West 1991) (specifying prohibitions on
U.S. citizens' participation in connection with certain foreign-instigated boycotts).
25. O'Quinn, supra note 14, at 12 (emphasis added). For a complete discussion of the
various sanctions enacted to protest South Africa's apartheid regime, see Spiro, supra note
2, at 816-22. The author describes procurement regulations like those adopted by Massa-
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The Massachusetts law recently struck down by the district
court26 prohibits "a state agency,.. . authority, the house of represent-
atives or the state senate" from procuring goods and services from
persons listed on a "restricted purchase list" maintained by the secre-
tary of administrations and finance or who, though not on the re-
stricted list, "is determined through an affidavit or ... other reliable
methods to meet the criteria for so being listed."'27 All contracts made
chusetts and discussed below as a "new wrinkle" and without "parallel at either the state or
federal level." Id at 821-22.
Many of the current state and local sanctions under discussion are of the type most
commonly known as procurement restrictions, which "impose general prohibitions on the
procurement of goods and services with a [foreign county] connection," as opposed to
divestment restrictions. Spiro, supra note 2, at 821. The latter were chosen for many of the
anti-apartheid statutes; they required partial or full divestment of state- or municipally-
managed funds and investments (e.g., pension funds) from investments with South-Africa
related firms. See id. at 819-22. The predecessor of the newest type of sanctions may have
been a 1985 ordinance passed by the City of Pittsburgh, which
banned city purchases not only from business entities with South African opera-
tions, but also from corporations providing goods or services to American con-
cerns connected with South Africa; that municipality, in other words, may no
longer deal with such firms as IBM, Ford, Texaco, and Coca-Cola, nor with any of
their suppliers.
Id. at 821-22 (citation omitted). Because the majority of the anti-apartheid divestment
enactments were linked, however, to investment decisions for states' and cities' own ac-
counts and finances - "an area of special state concern, and [one] without an explicit fed-
eral expression of preemptive intent," id. at 849 - the few such divestment statutes
challenged in court generally have been able to pass muster against preemption and consti-
tutionally-based arguments. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. As will be seen,
contemporary procurement restrictions sweep more broadly.
26. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. This was the first "selective
purchasing law against Burma" to be enacted in the nation. Price & Hannah, supra note 12,
at 449. Selective purchasing legislation currently pending before the New York State As-
sembly is closely modeled after Massachusetts's Myanmar sanctions statute. See A.B. No.
9147, 221st Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1998). New York City has adopted a comparable municipal
ordinance directed at Myanmar. Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 450-52. Many of the
local ordinances in Massachusetts are likewise modeled after the state statute's provisions.
See NEWrON, MASS., Rnv. ORDINANCE §§ 2-208 to 2-209 (1997) [hereinafter NEWTON OR-
DINANCE]; QUINCY, MASS., MUN. CODE ch. 2.48.020 (1997) [hereinafter QUINCY ORxi-
NANCE ; SOMERVILLE, MASS., PROPOSED ORDINANCE § 2-386 (1997) [hereinafter
SOmERVILLE ORDINANCE]; see also An Act Related to State Investments in or Contracts
with Companies Doing Business with Burma (Myanmar), H.B. 2960 75th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 1997) (adopting Massachusetts's "doing business with" definition).
27. MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 7 § 22H (a) (West 1998 Supp.). The only exceptions are
for "essential procurement," see id. § 22H (b)(1) (1998 Supp.), or instances in which dis-
qualification would result in inadequate competition. See id. § 22H (b)(2) (1998 Supp.).
Humanitarian and news-gathering organizations are also exempt. See id. § 22H(e) (1998
Supp.) (exempting news and telecommunications providers) & § 221 (1998 Supp.) (exempt-
ing medical suppliers).
Leaving aside the overall constitutionality of Massachusetts' statute, the creation of
the restricted list itself raises significant due process concerns. Namely, the ability to have
a person or business essentially face blacklisting, based on little more than the submission
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SANCTIONS"
in violation of these provisions are void.' Before awarding any pro-
curement contract, the "awarding authority" is required to obtain a
statement from the bidder, made under penalty of perjury, "declaring
the nature and extent to which said person is engaging in activities
which would subject [the bidder] to inclusion on the restricted
purchase list."
2 9
The restricted purchase list, according to the statute, includes
"the names of all persons currently doing business with Burma (My-
anmar). ''30 Both the "persons"'3 1 covered under the statute and the
range of activities that qualify for "doing business with" Burma are
defined quite broadly,32 as is the term of "the government of Burma
(Myanmar)." The latter includes "any national corporation in which
of "an affidavit or... other reliable methods," see id. § 22H (a) (1998 Supp.), without
being apparently afforded an opportunity for notice and challenge prior to being added to
the restricted list, would seem to violate the most basic minimum requirements of proce-
dural due process long required by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950) (requiring minimum notice requirement of
due process to be that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections."); see also Wilner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S.
96, 106 (1963) (holding that the activities of the New York bar association's character and
fitness committee in not providing a candidate with an opportunity to contest an adverse
report was a deprivation of such candidate's right to procedural due process). According
to the district court in National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, a procedure existed under
the Massachusetts statute by which a company could respond to a preliminary finding that
it belonged on the restricted purchase list. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26
F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass. 1998).
Also, while state and local sanctions like Massachusetts's statute are most passionately
advocated by human rights activists, the evidentiary provisions of the Massachusetts stat-
ute may provide a curious and sinister example of the "politics makes strange bedfellows"
adage. When one considers the persons and groups who may have the strongest motiva-
tion to turn in would-be violators of the statute, these may not necessarily be only idealistic
activists. Disgruntled competitors may use the statute as a weapon in an attempt to dis-
qualify their competitors for state procurement opportunities. The authors are indebted to
Michael A. Gatje for this observation.
28. MAss. GEN. L. ArN. ch. 7 § 22L (1998 Supp.).
29. Id. § 22H (2)(c) (1998 Supp.).
30. Id. § 22J (a).
31. See id. § 22G (1998 Supp.).
32. "Doing business with the government of Burma (Myanmar)" is defined as:
(a) having a place of business, place of incorporation, its corporate headquar-
ters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any operations, leases, franchises, majority-
owned subsidiaries, distribution agreements, or any other similar agreements in
Burma (Myanmar), or being the majority-owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise
of such a person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma (Myanmar), in-
cluding ... direct loans, underwriting government securities, providing any con-
suiting advice or assistance, providing brokerage services, acting as trustee or
escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant to a contractual
agreement;
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Burma (Myanmar) has a financial interest or operational responsibili-
ties."'3 3 As a consequence, while no company had been formally ex-
cluded from bidding under Massachusetts's statute by mid-1997, more
than 150 foreign companies, including Honda, Nestle and Siemens,
and over 40 U.S. companies, including Mobil and PepsiCo, were on
that state's restricted purchase list.
3 4
A similar bill targeting Nigeria, introduced in Maryland in 1997,
was actively opposed by the U.S. State Department35 and was ulti-
mately defeated. This bill required all financial institutions used as
state depositories to certify, in writing, that they had neither "direct
loans" nor "foreknowledge of any indirect loans outstanding" to
either a governmental unit or national corporation of Nigeria.36 The
bill imposed similar certification requirements on state contractors
soliciting bids for jobs worth $10,000 or more, who were required to
certify "that the bidder... is not doing business with or in Nigeria or
knowingly subcontracting with an entity that does so."
'37
The Rhode Island legislature is considering a similar investment
measure. In its current form, this bill states that "no assets subject to
investment by or otherwise under the jurisdiction of the state invest-
ment commission shall be invested in any security representing an eq-
uity interest in or a debt or other obligation in East Timor, Indonesia"
and requires divestment of any such investment.3 8 Virginia is consid-
ering banning state procurement of goods "produced or manufactured
in whole or in part by forced or indentured labor under the penal
sections of the People's Republic of China. ' 39 Berkeley, California's
ordinance requires companies with whom that city does business to
certify that they would not even be willing to provide personal serv-
ices or goods to the government of Nigeria, which, at least until the
recent death of the despotic General Sani Abacha, was a favorite tar-
get of state and local governments.
40
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or other re-
lated products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the government of
Burma (Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar);
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma (Myanmar).
Id. § 22G (1998 Supp.).
33. Id.
34. Spear, supra note 14.
35. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
36. S. 354, 1998 Reg. Sess., § 1 (Md. 1998).
37. Id.
38. H. 6721, 1997-98 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1997).
39. H. 1324, 1998 Sess. § 1(B)(4) (Va. 1998).
40. See BERKELEY, CAL., R1s. No. 5985-NS, § III.A [hereinafter BERKELEY
ORDINANCE].
A Florida statute, enacted in 1992, which at first appears to be a
throwback to the so-called "communist goods" ordinances of the
1960s that placed certain licensing and notice requirements on the im-
port and sale of Eastern Bloc goods in various jurisdictions, puts a
slightly different wrinkle in the latest sanctions legislation.4 In the
Florida statute, no explicit procurement ban on sales to or from Cuba
is imposed. The statute's practical effect, rather more subtly, is to dis-
courage potential investments in certain companies or their affiliates if
such a company or its affiliates "does business with the government of
Cuba or with any person or affiliate located in Cuba."'42 If a company,
itself or through its affiliates, does business with any entity located in
Cuba - not just the Cuban government - and if such company is en-
gaged in a securities offering that does not meet exemptions from re-
gistration under federal or state laws,43 the company must make
various detailed disclosures in its securities prospectus as to the nature
of its business dealings in Cuba.' Moreover, failure to comply with
this requirement may subject the company in question to fines, injunc-
tive relief, and a potential civil cause of action.45
Notwithstanding the fact that federal legislation already prohibits
most trading with Cuba46 and that recent federal securities legislation
has essentially preempted and gutted this statute (at least on a na-
tional stock exchange level),47 the Florida statute is still an interesting
counterpoint to the other pending or enacted sanctions statutes be-
41. For more on these early forerunners of the anti-apartheid and procurement sanc-
tions of the 1980s and 1990s, see Richard B. Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in
Private, Labor Union, State, and Local Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
841, 862-923 (1970) (reviewing examples of state, local and labor union-inspired statutes,
ordinances and boycotts directed against the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China,
Cuba and other communist regimes and the various legal challenges to such activities);
Note, Ordinances Restricting the Sale of "Communist Goods," 65 COLUM. L. REv. 310,310-
18 (1965) (finding the anti-communist goods ordinances to be flawed under Commerce
Clause and federal preemption grounds and as being discriminatory against foreign
commerce).
42. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.075(1) (West 1997). An additional series of administrative
regulations promulgated by Florida's Securities Commissioner expands upon the statute's
requirements. Fla. Rule 3E-900.001, cited in 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 17,531, at
13,447.
43. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.075(8) (West 1997).
44. Id. § 517.075(2).
45. Id. § 517.075(5)-.075(6).
46. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.A. § 6005 (West 1998 Supp.) (imposing certain prohibitions on
business transactions and banning "vessels carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba"
from entering any United States port); id. § 6032 (West 1998 Supp.) (regarding enforce-
ment of the long-standing United States economic embargo against Cuba).
47. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-290, § 102(a),
990 Stat. 3417 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West 1997)).
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cause it indirectly shifts the onus from the state and places it squarely
on the company. Simultaneously, the Florida statute strives to imple-
ment two of the same features often found in the more recent subna-
tional sanctions legislation. While ostensibly enacted to sanction the
Castro regime, it also subjects the U.S. company that does business
directly or indirectly with Cuba to public scrutiny and "pariah" status,
apparently hoping to discourage potential investors in Florida from
buying such company's stock as a matter of solidarity with the large
anti-Castro community residing in that state. Furthermore, the stat-
ute, independently of longstanding federal sanctions, may implicitly
function as Florida's own foreign policy "big stick" with which to chas-
tise the Castro regime as it forces potential stock issuers either to
abandon their Cuban business activities or to undertake elaborate dis-
closures not required of other securities issues in Florida.
As is clear from these examples, these measures sweep broadly.
Companies generally are prohibited from having any connection to
the target country, direct or indirect, which can even reach company
contracts with third parties who do business in target countries.48
Even those measures that seek only to control where a state or local
government deposits its money can potentially reach loans made by a
financial institution to a company with ties to a target country.49
While supporters of such measures would, no doubt, claim that such
breadth is necessary to prevent companies from merely shunting for-
bidden business off to wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, the state and
local sanctions' extraterritorial reach has ramifications for supporters'
assertions that such requirements are merely incidental to their partic-
ipation in the market.5"
In the following sections, we examine the two main constitutional
objections to the imposition of indirect sanctions by state and local
governments on national governments and regimes with whose poli-
cies they disagree.
48. See generally notes 25, 30-31 and accompanying text.
49. See generally notes 25 & 38 and accompanying text. As one commentator has
noted about the practical effects of the anti-apartheid divestment laws: "[T]he state and
local sanctions are more than narrowly tailored laws designed to achieve purely local pur-
poses. They are aimed at altering the international conduct of U.S. target companies as
well as the behavior of the particular foreign governments." Howard N. Fenton, III, The
Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions,
13 Nw. J. Iwr'L L. & Bus. 563, 579 (1993).
50. See infra notes 223-92 and accompanying text.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SANCrIONS"
H. The Foreign Affairs Power
If there is one thing that all delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-
tion of 1787 could have agreed upon had a poll been taken, it would
likely have been the necessity for national uniformity in the conduct
of relations with other countries.51 The structure of the Constitution
itself reflects this concern by restricting the ability of states to form
alliances 5 2 make treaties 5 3 wage war,54 and tax commerce.55 Even
prominent Antifederalists conceded the propriety of federal regula-
51. See generally THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 22, at 131 (Alexander
Hamilton):
In addition to the defects already enumerated in the existing Foederal [sic] sys-
tem, there are others of not less importance which concur in rendering it alto-
gether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.
The want of a power to regulate commerce ... has already operated as a bar
to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers,.., and [n]o nation
acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to
enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges
of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the
part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members ....
Id.; see also "Marcus" JV [James Iredell], Mar. 12, 1788, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE
CoNsTrrunroN 386-87 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (arguing that the ability to bring Great
Britain to terms, and to extricate the State from "our present degrading commerce with
that country," requires "a powerful [national] government, which can dictate conditions of
advantage to ourselves") [hereinafter DEBATE]; Governor Edmund Randolph's Reasons
for Not Signing the Constitution, Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 1 id. at 600 (criticizing the
situation as to management of the nation's foreign affairs under the Articles of Confedera-
tion as being one of "thirteen distinct communities under no effective superintending con-
troul [sic]"); Resolution of the Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, Nov. 17, 1787, reprinted in 1 id. at
324 (urging ratification of the Constitution to remedy "the weakness of Congress to take
proper measures with the courts of Spain and Britain"); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A.
HARBISON, THE Am~RIcAN CONSTITUrION: ITS OGmINS AND DEVELOPMENT 111 (3d ed.
1963) ("By 1786, many, especially nationalists, thought the United States was a political
failure.... A weak and helpless government was unable to defend its sovereignty against
Britain, Spain, or the western Indians; Congressional foreign policy seemed equally ineffec-
tive."); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLTICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1996) ("[T]he most serious doubts about the adequacy of the Arti-
cles of Confederation arose over the inability of Congress to frame and implement satisfac-
tory foreign policies. The emerging dilemmas of the mid-1780s ... revealed ... that
Congress lacked the formal authority it needed to protect American commercial inter-
ests."); id. at 26-27 (describing the results of Congress' "[1lacking authority to regulate
interstate or foreign commerce"); Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 190 n.56 ("One
of the major defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling reason for the
calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, was the fact that the Articles essentially
left the individual States free to burden commerce both among themselves and with for-
eign countries very much as they pleased.").
52. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cI. 1.
53. See id.
54. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
55. See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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tion of foreign affairs, including the uniform regulation of foreign
commerce.
5 6
From the history that informed the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution, as well as its structural provisions, the modern Supreme
Court has inferred certain limitations on subnational power to con-
duct foreign affairs.5 7 These restrictions bear directly on the question
of whether the new round of state and local sanctions can be under-
taken in harmony with the Constitution.5 8 The cases in which the
56. See, e.g., Richard Henry Lee, Oct. 8, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTiFEDERALSTS 207
(Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1966) ("Let the general government['s] powers extend exclusively
to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, navies,
Indian affairs, [and to] peace and war .... ); "Agrippa" [James Winthrop] IX, Dec. 28,
1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 51, at 629 (urging the amendment of the Articles
to give Congress "a limited right to regulate our intercourse with foreign nations");
"Agrippa" [James Winthrop) XII, Jan. 14, 1788, reprinted in id. at 144 ("[T]he intercourse
between us and foreign nations properly forms the department of Congress."); see also
JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 181 (1961) ("One power which most An-
tifederalists were willing to concede to Congress was control over commerce.... [Tlhere
was only scattered objection [raised by the Antifederalists] to the commerce clause.");
"Agrippa" [James Winthorp] XVIII, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE, supra note 51, at
160 (urging defeat of the proposed Constitution, but proposing the passage of "an explicit
resolve, defining the powers of Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and for-
eign nations"); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE
PoLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONsTITTMON 27 (1981) ("The Anti-
Federalists agreed with Publius [i.e., James Madison] that 'if we are to be one nation in any
respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."').
This view appears to have been widely accepted at the time by most commentators on
the Constitution and the federal system. As De Tocqueville noted some fifty years after
ratification:
The people in themselves are only individuals; and the special reason why they
need to be united under one government is that they may appear to advantage
before foreigners. The exclusive right of making peace and war, of concluding
treaties of commerce, raising armies, and equipping fleets, was therefore granted
to the Union.
1 ALEXs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 120 (Henry Reeve trans. & Phil-
lips Bradley ed., 1945).
57. While the powers to regulate foreign and interstate commerce are both constitu-
tionally granted to Congress in similar wording, "there is evidence that the Founders in-
tended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater." JOHN E. NowAK,
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 4.2, at 125 n.2 (3d
ed. 1986) (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979))
(footnote omitted).
58. A student commentator in favor of state and local sanctions writes that because
there is no specific prohibition on states exercising power in foreign affairs or in foreign
commerce, the claim that federal power in these areas is exclusive must, of necessity, fail.
See Carvajal, supra note 19, at 262 & n.31. This is constitutional literalism in the extreme.
First, there are specific prohibitions on states' foreign affairs powers. The Constitution
prohibits states from burdening foreign commerce with "imposts and excises," from engag-
ing in acts of war, and from making treaties with other countries. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 10, cls. 1-3. Second, even cursory attention to constitutional history demonstrates that
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SANCTIONS"
Supreme Court has articulated these limits are a logical point of de-
parture for our discussion.
A. Supreme Court Limitations on States' Involvement in Foreign
Affairs
In Hines v. Davidowitz, 9 decided in 1941, the Supreme Court
struck down a Pennsylvania alien-registration statute that purported
to "complement" less rigorous measures passed by Congress. Writing
for the Court, Justice Black found the state scheme inconsistent with
its federal counterpart, despite the lack of either an actual conflict be-
tween the two or of Congress's prohibition of analogous state action.6 °
The statute, being "in a field which affects international relations, the
one aspect of our own government that from the first has been most
generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national author-
ity," was deemed fundamentally different from other concurrent pow-
ers, like the power to tax.6' Therefore, "[a]ny concurrent state power
that may exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits ... ."I The
Court formulated the appropriate standard of review in such cases as
being "whether, under the circumstances of this particular case [the
statute] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '63 Noting that the limi-
tations on aliens imposed by Congress were passed in the face of
other, more restrictive congressional proposals akin to those passed
the necessity for uniformity in foreign affairs, including the regulation of foreign com-
merce, was recognized even by the Antifederalists. See supra notes 51, 56 and accompany-
ing text. Third, such a literalist reading assumes no role for reasoning from both text and
structure in constitutional interpretation. Under such an approach, the very values of fed-
eralism that the author thinks mandate respect for subnational sanctions would be under-
protected because of the absence of a specific textual provision.
The author also cites Article III's provision that extends the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to cases involving a state and its citizens and foreign states or its subjects, see
U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2, as proof that states were intended to play a role in foreign affairs.
See Carvajal, supra note 19, at 262-63. Actually, that example cuts the other way. The
obvious reason for placing controversies between states and foreign governments within
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seems to be that the Framers wished to ensure
that such cases would be heard in a federal, not a state, judicial forum.
59. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
60. See id. at 74. Cf id. at 75 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("Assuming... that Congress
could constitutionally set up an exclusive registration system for aliens, I think it has not
done so and that it is not the province of the courts to do that which Congress has failed to
do.").
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 67.
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by Pennsylvania, Justice Black concluded that Congress had intended
to go only as far as it did, and Pennsylvania could thus go no further.64
The strongest statement of the exclusivity of the foreign affairs
power, however, came in Zschernig v. Miller,65 a 1968 case in which
the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon statute that prohibited
aliens from inheriting from a decedent's estate where the country in
which the alien resided (East Germany, in this case) did not allow
reciprocal inheritance by foreign citizens. The decision was somewhat
of a surprise since only twenty years before, in Clark v. Allen,66 the
Court had upheld a similar statute on the books in California. Justice
Douglas, the author of Clark, reached the opposite conclusion in
Zschernig without overruling his previous decision.
In Clark, a testator who died during World War II left property in
a will to nonresident German aliens, who were barred under Califor-
nia law from taking under the will.' The California statute at issue
stated that nonresident aliens could not take under a will unless citi-
zens of the United States were entitled to take under the laws of de-
scent and distribution of that country on the same terms as its
citizens.
68
While much of the Court's opinion in Clark turned upon the ef-
fect of the war on various treaties signed with Germany and on the
effect of the Federal Trading with the Enemy Act,69 a challenge to the
California statute was also made on that grounds that it "is an exten-
sion of state power into the field of foreign affairs, which is exclusively
reserved by the Constitution to the Federal Government."7 For the
Court, Justice Douglas rejected this challenge. "Rights of succession
64. See id. at 69-73. Fifteen years later, when Pennsylvania again attempted to supple-
ment the enforcement of federal sedition laws with its own statute, the Court again ruled
against the Commonwealth on grounds of federal preemption. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956). The Court felt that the passage of a federal sedition statute precluded
Pennsylvania from adopting complementary or supplemental legislation. Chief Justice
Warren wrote that the state plan "touch[ed] a field in which the federal interest is so domi-
nant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude state laws on the same subject."
Id. at 504 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Allowing the statute to stand would "present[ ] a serious dan-
ger of conflict with the administration of the federal program." Id. at 505. For more on
preemption in this context, see infra note 81.
65. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
66. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
67. See id. at 506 & n.1.
68. See id. at 506.
69. See id. at 507-16.
70. Id. at 516.
to property," he wrote, "are determined by local law."' 71 Since the
action here was neither preempted by "different or conflicting ar-
rangements" at the federal level, nor a forbidden negotiation with a
foreign nation or the making of a compact with another country, Cali-
fornia's statute did not "cross the forbidden line" despite the "inciden-
tal or indirect effect" the statute might have in other countries.7 2
However, twenty years later, in Zschernig, Douglas concluded that
Oregon's statute had crossed that line.73
The difference between the two cases, as explained by Justice
Douglas, hinged on subsequent evidence that, in the administration of
statutes like that passed in Oregon,
the probate courts of various states ha[d] launched inquiries into
the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign na-
tions-whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights,
whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning
upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the
representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representa-
tives of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith,
whether there is in the actual administration in the particular
foreign system of law any element of confiscation.7 4
Douglas concluded that Oregon's statute (and others like it) "in-
escapab[ly] ... affects international relations in a persistent and subtle
way"'75 and had "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" to
the United States foreign relations because of its search "for the 'de-
mocracy quotient' of a foreign regime. ' 76 The Court's previous deci-
sion in Clark did not sanction "[t]hat kind of state involvement in
foreign affairs and international relations-matters which the Consti-
tution entrusts solely to the Federal Government" ' 77 and "not [to] lo-
cal probate courts. '' 78 While acknowledging Oregon's statute was
"not as gross an intrusion into the federal domain as ... others might
be[,] ... it has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well
adversely affect the power" of the federal government.79 If such re-
straints are to be imposed, Douglas concluded, "they must be pro-
vided by the Federal Government;" and not the executive, but the
71. 1& at 517.
72. Id
73. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
74. 1I at 433-34.
75. Id at 440.
76. IiL at 435.
77. Id at 436.
78. Id. at 437-38.
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judicial, branch bears the ultimate burden as to whether such a mea-
sure is grossly intrusive into the foreign affairs power.80
Supporters of subnational sanctions have interpreted Justice
Douglas' refusal in Zschernig to overturn Clark explicitly and his fo-
cus on the potential impact the California statute had on foreign af-
fairs to mean that as long as state organs do not hold hearings into a
country's "democracy quotient," do not enact statutes that conflict
with laws of Congress, and refrain from passing measures having other
than an "incidental or indirect effect" in foreign countries, state and
local sanctions do not encroach on federal power over foreign affairs
so as to be preempted by federal law.81 One commentator writes that
"implicit" in the Court's allowing Clark to stand is the view
80. Id. See also Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 457.
81. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720,
744-46 (Md. 1989); Jubinsky, supra note 2, at 570-72; Lewis, supra note 2, at 513-14 (sug-
gesting ways state and local governments might navigate the shoals of Zschernig; conclud-
ing that "the divestment statutes ought to be outside the preemption doctrine as a matter
of policy"). Given that legislation is pending currently before Congress, however, with
respect to the imposition of sanctions on several regimes, including Nigeria's, see, e.g., S.
2102, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3890, 105th Cong. (1998), the likelihood for state and local
sanctions to come into conflict with congressional enactments, not to mention "[having] a
direct impact upon foreign relations," is much greater, so that a stronger case may exist for
federal preemption of the current wave of subnational sanctions. See infra notes 112, 120-
22 & 165, and accompanying text. See also Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 202-03;
Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 472-78. One of the defenders of subnational sanctions
devotes considerable effort to refuting Schmahmann and Finch's arguments for preemp-
tion. See Carvajal, supra note 19, at 256-66. We agree that there are stronger constitu-
tional arguments for such recent subnational sanctions' invalidity.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant in recent years to find an implied intent to
preempt state law, preferring as a rule to allow states to act in the absence of an explicit
congressional intent to the contrary. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[w]e begin 'with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded.., unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."') (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee, Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the
Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CoNsT. CoMrwARY 311, 317 (1988) (noting the Court's
"extreme reluctance.., to find preemption"). Professor Rotunda summarized the Court's
attitude as follows: "Preemption exists if Congress clearly and explicitly provides for it by
statute. Otherwise, if it is possible for the party to comply both with the federal law and
the state regulation-if such dual compliance is not 'physically impossible'-then the
Court is unlikely to find preemption." Id. But see Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986) (finding state debarment statute
aimed at repeat violators of the National Labor Relations Act to be preempted by an
"'integrated scheme of regulation' created by Congress").
Because, as Schmahmann and Finch admit, congressional legislation with regards to
sanctions against Myanmar "is silent as to its preemptive effect," Schmahmann & Finch,
supra note 15, at 184, we doubt that a court would imply preemption to invalidate state and
that states are permitted to enact laws that clearly pass moral
judgment over foreign nations, but states may not indulge in de-
tailed inquiries into their affairs. As long as states avoid this
overly intrusive inquiry, the Court is suggesting that they will be
allowed to pass moral legislation in foreign relations."2
On the contrary, despite allowing Clark to stand, Justice Douglas
seemed to recognize that laws like that challenged in Clark invite de-
tailed inquiries about "democracy quotients" in other countries, which
cannot not be permitted because of the potential for mischief in the
conduct of foreign policy.8 3 Moreover, as detailed below, many of
local sanctions. This is especially true given the availability of stronger constitutional argu-
ments for invalidation. Of course, the Supreme Court has, in the past, used preemption as
a "preferential ground" for avoiding decisions on more substantive constitutional grounds,
like the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); see generally Note, Preemp-
tion as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 SAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
The author of the Stanford note cites examples in which the Court invalidated state
measures "despite the fact that none of the interpretive sources revealed a federal policy
which required... invalidation" and concluding that the "Court bases its decision on pre-
emption ground[s] in order to avoid reaching some other constitutional question." Id. at
210. Many of the cases the author cited involved the Court's "use [of] essentially the same
reasoning process in cases nominally hinging on pre-emption as it has in past cases in which
the question was whether the state law regulated or burdened interstate commerce." Id. at
219-20. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the Supreme Court, unwilling to
issue an opinion on the limits of federalism in foreign affairs, simply concludes that Con-
gress either intended to preempt state action, or much as it did in Davidowitz, concludes
that legislation with regard to certain countries "occupied the field," leaving no room for
parallel state measures.
In fact, the court in Baker rejected the National Foreign Trade Council's preemption
argument. Noting that the "[p]laintiff's burden is particularly heavy because... implied,
rather than express preemption [is argued]," the court found that evidence of Congress'
intent to impose unilateral sanctions on Myanmar "does not establish sufficient actual con-
flict for this court to find implied preemption." National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker,
26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998).
82. Carvajal, supra note 19, at 268.
83. Carvajal also suggests that Zschernig's concern that only the federal government
conduct foreign policy should be read against, and limited by, a Cold War backdrop. See
Carvajal, supra note 19, at 267-68; see also id. at 269: "In today's global context, nations
are no longer tenuously balanced on the verge of world war. . . . Thus, state and local
selective-purchasing laws should not be treated as if they function in a hostile international
context where every political move is understood in reference to an ongoing or potential
war." This statement is a non sequitur. Concerns with state conduct of foreign policy
predated the Cold War, and the prevention of wars does not exhaust the reasons why
having states pursue separate foreign policies independently from the federal government
is a bad idea. It is worth noting, though, that wars have certainly begun over "mere"
commercial disagreements. The War of 1812 resulted, in part, from British interference
with American shipping, and a de facto war was waged between the Jefferson administra-
tion and France some ten years previously, again largely originating over commercial is-
sues. As a more recent example, it has been suggested that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor was partly a reaction to embargoes on raw materials imposed on that nation for its
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these sanctions do entail "detailed inquiries into [foreign countries']
affairs,"' to the degree that city commissions have even arrogated to
themselves the power to determine whether democracy has been re-
stored in a particular country.85
Nevertheless, courts and commentators have cited Zschernig's re-
fusal to overrule Clark as evidence of the Supreme Court's desire to
apply the Zschernig rule sparingly. For example, in 1989 the Mary-
land Court of Appeal upheld a Baltimore municipal ordinance requir-
ing that city's pension fund to divest itself of holdings in companies
doing business in South Africa.86 The court distinguished Zschernig
on the grounds that, in that case, the Supreme Court had merely "cir-
cumscribe[d], but apparently . ..not eliminate[d] a state's ability
under certain circumstances to take actions involving substantive
judgments about foreign nations."87 The court held that the effect on
relations between the United States and South Africa would be "mini-
mal and indirect" and cited Clark for the proposition that "[a] state or
local law is not invalid if it has only 'some incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries."88
B. Lower Courts and the Foreign Affairs Power
Other courts have not interpreted Zschernig so liberally. The
year after the Supreme Court decided Zschernig, the California Court
of Appeal invalidated that state's "Buy American" statute, which pro-
hibited the procurement of foreign goods for use by the State. 9 Start-
ing from the premise that "'[flor national purposes, embracing our
THm SuN: THm AMERICAN WAR wrrH JAPAN, 68-69, 75-78 (1985). At the very least, sanc-
tions by states can create ill-will within the target countries against not just an individual
state, but the entire country. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (describing
actions by certain Swiss retailers in retaliation for state and local sanctions on Swiss banks
prior to the Holocaust settlement).
84. Carvajal, supra note 19, at 268.
85. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
86. Board of Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
87. Id. at 746.
88. Id. at 747 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. at 517), 749. The court relied on a
secondary source (a student note) for the rather conclusory proposition that state divest-
ment "in a corporation doing business in South Africa... has [no] immediate effect on
foreign relations between South Africa and the United States." Id. (quoting Jubinsky,
supra note 2, at 574).
89. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App.
1969).
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relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one
power,"' 9 the California Court of Appeals concluded that
[t]he California Buy American Act, in effectively placing an em-
bargo on foreign products, amounts to a usurpation by this state
of the power of the federal government to conduct foreign trade
policy. That there are countervailing state policies which are
served by the retention of such an act is "wholly irrelevant to
judiciary inquiry" .... 91
"Foreign trade," the court continued, "is properly a subject of na-
tional concern, not state regulation. State regulation can only impede,
not foster, national trade policies. The problems of trade expansion
or non-expansion are national in scope, and properly should be na-
tional in scope in their resolution."9
The California court concluded by raising the specter of foreign
retaliation against the entire nation because of the actions of a single
state, echoing Alexander Hamilton's warning in The Federalist No. 80
that "the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the discretion of a
PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers
for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it."'93
The court reasoned that California's legislation "may bear a particular
onus to foreign nations since it may appear to be the product of selfish
provincialism, rather than as an instrument of justifiable policy. It is a
type of protectionism which invites retaliatory action on our own
trade." 94 The California Court of Appeal thus regarded the possibility
of such a disruption as sufficient to overcome whatever benevolent
state policies motivated the statute's enactment. If the federal govern-
ment decided to institute a "Buy American" policy or erect barriers to
the importation of foreign goods, it could do so, but such actions could
not be unilaterally undertaken by individual states.
Likewise, in 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a state
anti-apartheid measure on similar grounds.95 The Illinois high court
90. Id. at 802 (quoting 2 BERNARD ScHwARTz, A COMMENTARY ON Th CONSTn-
TION OF TIE UNITED STATES § 206 (1963)).
91. Id. at 803 (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)).
92. Id. at 803.
93. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 80, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton).
94. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
95. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986)
(striking down Illinois law creating exemptions from state taxes for coins and currency
issued by the United States and foreign countries, except South Africa); see also New York
Times Co. v. New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963 (N.Y. 1977); Tayyari v.
New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980) (overturning decision by Uni-
versity of New Mexico Board of Regents to exclude Iranian students from that university
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struck down a discriminatory tax on the sales of South African gold
coins (Krugerrands), concluding that (i) "the exclusion's sole motiva-
tion is disapproval of a nation's policies"; (ii) "the exclusion is
targeted at a single foreign nation"; and (iii) "the practical effect of
the exclusion is to impose, or at least encourage an economic boy-
cott."96 It concluded that measures "which amount to embargoes or
boycotts are outside the realm of permissible State activity. 97
The cases in this area of constitutional jurisprudence seem to
stand for the following propositions. First, foreign affairs are the pri-
mary, if not the exclusive, domain of the federal government. Second,
though the States in the enforcement of their laws will occasionally
touch on or indirectly affect foreign affairs, the States have little, if
any, concurrent power to regulate foreign affairs directly, in the same
way that they may exercise concurrent powers, like that of taxation.
Third, any power that may exist is to be interpreted in the narrowest
possible manner, and courts may preclude state action even in the ab-
sence of an express congressional prohibition or an explicit conflict
between a state enactment and a federal statute relating to foreign
in retaliation for the taking of American hostages in Tehran; action precluded in part by
authority the Constitution gives to the federal government in matters of foreign affairs).
But see General Elec. Co. v. New York State Assembly Comm. on Govt'l Operations, 425
F. Supp. 909 (N.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that federal government's power over foreign af-
fairs did not preempt state legislature's subpoena of materials relating to alleged "Arab
boycott" carried on by plaintiff).
In New York Times Co., the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
reversal of a decision of New York City's Commission on Human Rights that found the
New York Times Corporation violated the City's antidiscrimination laws by publishing ad-
vertisements for employment opportunities in South Africa. 361 N.E.2d at 969. "The real-
ity is that complainants seek to impose an economic boycott aimed at the present
government of the Republic South Africa.... [W]e would conclude that a city agency was
without jurisdiction to make and enforce its own foreign policy." Id. at 968. "The peace
and security of the United States," the court continued, "has not been left to the whim of
but one State whose actions would have consequences, perhaps dire, for all the States. The
Federal Government represents the collective interests of all the States .... ." Id.L
The court also noted the danger that the proliferation of these sorts of measures posed
to the formation of a coherent, national foreign policy:
The true danger is that if New York City could do this in one instance, it could do
so in many instances.... This would be disastrous, not only because of multiplic-
ity and divergence of policies, but because local decisions are often influenced by
pragmatic local considerations which are not necessarily controlling or even rele-
vant to national policy ....
Id. at 969.
96. Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc., 503 N.E.2d at 307.
97. Id.; see also Price and Hannah, supra note 12, at 467-68; Fenton, supra note 49, at
567 (noting that congressional enactment in 1977 of the Export Administration Act, 50
U.S.C. app. § 2407(c) (1988), "expressly preempted these state laws" as to restrictive trade
practices or boycotts).
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affairs. Fourth, even statutes that have only an incidental or specula-
tive affect on foreign affairs may be invalidated, especially if they in-
volve the search for Justice Douglas' "democracy quotient," viz.,
subnational governmental inquiries into forms of national government
and judgments about the policies of those national governments to-
wards their own citizens. 98
C. State and Local Sanctions and the Foreign Affairs Power
The differences between the statute in Clark, on the one hand,
and the state and local sanctions like those of Massachusetts, on the
other, are significant enough for a court to conclude that a state has
crossed Zschernig's "forbidden line" in its enactment of sanctions leg-
islation. First, Douglas stressed in Zschernig that probate courts had
begun to make detailed inquiries into the forms of government of var-
ious countries, and whether the assurances of foreign consuls and min-
isters could be taken as truthful by the court. In Clark, however, the
Court seemed to conclude that the California statute was applied rela-
tively evenhandedly, without any particularized inquiry into a foreign
government's ideology.99
In stark contrast, many sanctions contain lengthy preambles re-
plete with references to the shortcomings of particular regimes.100
Proposed resolutions submitted to the town of Brookline, Massachu-
setts condemned Myanmar's use of "institutionalized torture and rape
as political instruments"; its policy of "forcible relocation, forced labor
and slavery,... persecution of ethnic minorities"; and its denial "to
the people of Burma the right to participate in the political process,
98. See supra note 76; see also NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 57, § 4.2, at
125 (listing Article I, § 10's prohibitions on states' actions and concluding, "Thus it can be
safely asserted that there was no constitutional recognition of any 'reserved powers' of the
states to act in these areas.") (emphasis added).
99. Similarly, a Pennsylvania "Buy American" statute was upheld by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals because of a similar facial neutrality. See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Penn-
sylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990). In his opinion, Judge Louis Pollak emphasized this
fact: "Pennsylvania's statute provides no opportunity for state administrative officials or
judges to comment on, let alone key their decisions to, the nature of foreign regimes. On
its face the statute applies to steel from any foreign source, without respect to whether the
source country might be considered friend or foe." Id. at 913. Judge Pollak upheld the
statute in light of Zschernig in part because of his determination (backed only by the
strength of his own authority and reasoning) that "[s]tate procurement practices present no
problems reconciling conflicting policy among multiple national sovereigns." Id. at 912.
100. Compare S. 354, 1998 Reg. Sess. preamble (Md. 1998) (chronicling various anti-
democratic actions taken by the late General Sani Abacha's regime) with S. 2102, 105th
Cong. § 2 (1998) and H.R. 3890, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (similarly reciting Senate and
House findings, respectively, as to anti-democratic actions of the same Nigerian regime).
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the right to benefit from a fair and equitable system of justice and the
right to exercise fairly their economic rights." '' Maryland's proposed
sanctions against Nigeria stated that it "cannot, and will not, condone
or overlook the denial of democratic civilian rule, against the clear
wishes of the Nigerian people" and pledged "support [for] the Niger-
ian people in their commitment to unity and democracy ... ."I02 In
the preamble to its sanctions ordinance against Myanmar, Los Ange-
les condemns the State Law and Order Restoration Committee
(SLORC) regime as being in violation of "international law and mor-
ally repugnant to the citizens of Los Angeles."'10 3 In other sanctions
proposed against Nigeria, the City of Berkeley, California premised its
right to sanction the country on the fact that its citizens "believ[e] that
their quality of life is diminished when peace and justice are not fully
present in the world ....
Thus, the current wave of state and local sanctions are largely, if
not wholly, predicated on a determination about the relative whole-
someness of a particular country's form of government. They are not
therefore evenhanded, as they apply only to companies that trade with
specific countries - albeit ones with exceedingly reprehensible re-
gimes, by almost anyone's standards of human rights and political de-
velopment - whose governments, in turn, fail to achieve a state-
mandated "democracy quotient." The present state and local sanc-
tions, if anything, involve a more particularized inquiry because they
target specific countries, instead of all countries that share a particular
democratic deficiency; such as having no form of participatory democ-
racy, lacking freedom of speech guarantees, practicing torture or other
cruel and inhuman penal measures, or lacking guarantees of trial by
jury in criminal cases, to name some examples.10 5 Further, several of
101. Proposed Resolutions, Brookline, Mass., at 18-1 (unpublished and undated resolu-
tions, on file with authors).
102. An Act Concerning State Finance and Procurement-Sanctions Against Nigeria,
S. 354, 1998 Reg. Sess. preamble (Md. 1998); see also ALAMEDA CO., CAL., ORDNANCE
No. 0-98-27, at § 4.36.010 (1997) (declaring that a democratic transition plan in Nigeria was
"unacceptable because opposition groups were not consulted") [hereinafter ALAMEDA CO.
ORDINANCE].
103. Proposed Ordinance on Burma for the City of Los Angeles, preamble (rev. draft,
June 4, 1997) [hereinafter Los Angeles Ordinance]; see also id. (condemning the ruling
regime for denying "the majority of the population the right to participate in the political
process, to benefit from a system of justice, or to enjoy fundamental, generally accepted
economic and environmental rights").
104. BERKELEY ORDINANCE, supra note 40, preamble.
105. We think it makes no difference that the state organs making the inquiry in Clark
and Zschernig were courts and that legislative bodies are making these inquiries in contem-
porary examples of state and local sanctions. If states in general should be restrained from
the proposed sanctions leave it solely to the discretion of a local gov-
ernmental entity to decide when democracy or democratic rights have
been restored in a targeted country.1
0 6
Second, it is difficult to square the intended effect of these sanc-
tions10 7 - to deprive target countries of capital equipment, financial
resources, technology, and consulting services - with claims that their
effect will be "incidental or indirect." If a state or local government
wishes to make a symbolic gesture, why not pass a non-binding resolu-
tion denouncing a target nation's activities? Or why not petition Con-
gress or the President for a change in United States policy towards
such nations?'018 In any event, gauging the effect that these sanctions
might have on relations with a particular country hardly seems an ap-
interfering with the federal government's foreign affairs power, it is immaterial from which
branch of government the encroachment comes. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 514 & n.233;
see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding actions of New York State
court, in refusing to recognize the Soviet regime, and the State of New York's refusal to
enforce an executive agreement between the federal government and the Soviet Union, to
be invalid).
106. See, e.g., BERKELEY ORDINANCE, supra note 40, at § XI (policy to remain in effect
"until the City Council determines that the people of Nigeria have become self-gov-
erning"); NEWTON ORDINANcE, supra note 26, at § 2-209 ("This ordinance shall remain in
effect.., until the board of aldermen shall determine that Burma has restored democratic
rights."); SOMERViLLE ORDNANCE, supra note 26 at § 2-387 ("This ordinance shall remain
in effect.., until the board of aldermen shall determine that Burma has restored demo-
cratic rights."); see also ALAMEDA Co. ORDINANCE, supra note 102, at § 4.36.110 ("This
ordinance shall remain in effect from the established effective date until democratic rights
are restored in Nigeria."); OAKLAND, CM.., ORDINANCE No. 11886, § X [hereinafter OAK-
LAND ORDINANCE].
As the Supreme Court has noted, however, when considering the purpose of an ordi-
nance or statute at issue, a reviewing court will not be bound by the name, description or
legislative purpose expressed in the disputed enactment. Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 106 (1992); see also Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at
460-61.
107. See, e.g., Associated Press, States Dictate Own Foreign Policy, Apr. 13, 1998, avail-
able in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file, at 1 (quoting Mass. Rep. Byron Rushing, author
of Massachusetts' legislation presently under challenge: "We showed there was support at
the grass-roots level for action against Burma ... to advance the cause of human rights");
Greenberger, supra note 9, at A20 (quoting Rep. Rushing to similar effect); Iritani, supra
note 11, at D2 (quoting Massachusetts's Attorney General Harshbarger); Schmahmann &
Finch, supra note 15, at 197 & nn.100-05 (citing local lawmakers and preambles of several
cities' sanctions ordinances, providing the purported justifications for such ordinances).
108. See, e.g., An Act to Denounce the Heroin Traffic Trade from the Union of My-
anmar, Formerly Burma, and to Request Companies Presently Doing Business with the
State of North Carolina and Also Doing Business in the Union of Myanmar to Withdraw
Their Operations from the Union of Myanmar in Support of the Democracy Movement in
the Union of Myanmar, S. 1067, 1997 Sess. (N.C. 1997); H. 6614, Jan. 1997 Sess. (R.I. 1997)
(requesting that Congress sanction Indonesia for its occupation of East Timor).
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propriate job for the courts, even federal courts.10 9 Worse, many sup-
porters of state and local sanctions argue that while they
unquestionably intrude to some extent on foreign affairs, the slight
effect on relations with target countries should be balanced against the
State's interest in expressing moral outrage at social injustice around
the world."' Both sets of values are hardly commensurate. Asking a
court to make those sorts of ad hoc determinations brings to mind
Justice Scalia's trenchant observation that compares such endeavors
to "judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy.'' 11
Nor is there any evidence that the effect of subnational sanctions
on the relations between the United States and target countries is
merely incidental or minimal. Recent events in Switzerland confirm
Alexander Hamilton's prophecy that "[t]he Union will undoubtedly
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. '
According to the New York Times and the Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs Stuart Eizenstat, proposed sanctions by states
and municipalities against Switzerland "engendered anti-Americanism
in Switzerland .... 1113 A major Swiss retailer as a result "ban[ned]
four American products: sweet corn, California wine and two brands
of whisky, Jack Daniels and Four Roses.""' 4 It is worth noting that,
with the exception of the California wine, none of those products is
produced in a state that had threatened to sanction Switzerland over
109. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 824 (noting the difficulty of "precise measurement of
the ways and extent that these measures have contributed to ... decline" in relations
among the United States and South Africa during its apartheid era).
110. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 491, 515, 517; Jubinsky, supra note 2, at 574-75.
111. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 889, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (criticizing the Supreme Court's customary balancing methodology in its
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
112. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, No. 80, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,228-29 (Johnson, J., concurring) ("Whatever regu-
lations foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the general
government would be held responsible for them .... ") (emphasis added).
113. Sanger, supra note 9, at B2. To pressure the Swiss to increase the amount offered
to settle the controversy over bank accounts of Holocaust victims, New York City, New
York State, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Florida threatened Swiss banks with sanctions,
over the objections of the Clinton Administration. See, e.g., Sanctions Would Harm Every-
one, Swiss Say: Threat Over Bank Claims Spur Plea to Back Off, CI. TRIB., July 29, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 2880386. With the $1.25 billion settlement agreement reached in
August 1998 between Holocaust survivors and Swiss banks, state officials in New York,
California, and Pennsylvania have since indicated that their states will lift any existing
sanctions against the Swiss and cancel any planned but unexecuted sanctions. Amy Wald-
man, Holocaust Accord Ends Sanctions, N.Y. TIMns, Aug. 14, 1998, at A8.
114. Sanger, supra note 9, at B2_
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the claims of Holocaust survivors."' Similarly, Japan and the Euro-
pean Union initiated dispute settlement proceedings in 1997 before
the World Trade Organization in response to Massachusetts' passage
of its Myanmar sanctions." 6
To the extent that Justice Douglas intended to establish a stan-
dard that allowed for subnational forays into foreign affairs that are
futile or have only a limited effect, resulting in a statute's constitution-
ality turning on judicial determinations of degree, we think that Jus-
tices Stewart and Brennan provided a better standard in their
Zschernig concurrence. The degree of harm potentially caused by
such measures, Justice Stewart wrote, is not as important as "the basic
allocation of power between the States and the Nation.""' 7 If permit-
ted, statutes like the one invalidated in Zschernig "launch the State
upon a prohibited voyage into a domain of exclusively federal
competence.'
118
The patchwork of sanctions imposed by "50 separate State De-
partments"" 9 are, in practical effect, much like boycotts and embar-
goes against the target countries that are their subjects, in that their
ultimate aim is to deny state and local citizens the ability to engage in
commerce with the sanctioned countries.120 History, structure, and
the Supreme Court's own doctrine suggest that the Framers declined
to give the states a limited power to impose embargoes on other coun-
tries because the imposition of embargoes was a matter for the central
government to undertake.' 2 1 Furthermore, the only rationale that
prevented an explicit prohibition from being placed in the Constitu-
115. This indiscriminate retaliation calls into question the notion that in an increasingly
sophisticated globalized view, foreign sovereigns faced with sanctions from a particular
sub-national unit will merely target that unit for reciprocal retaliation. See, e.g., Spiro,
supra note 19, at 25.
116. Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 445 nn.7-10 & 463 n. 126-28.
117. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring).
119. See Spear, supra note 14.
120. See Price & Hannah, supra note 14, at 499 (reasoning that state and local sanctions
are essentially "secondary boycotts implemented through the coercive exercise of sover-
eign economic power").
121. Notes from the Committee of Detail indicate that such a power was, at one point,
sought to be reserved for the States in early drafts, but it did not survive to be ratified. See
2 RECoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) (Committee of Detail, III: "Each State may lay Embargoes in Tune of Scarcity.")
[hereinafter REcoRDs]. As ratified, the Constitution's explicit provisions against states'
actions relate to the imposition of duties of tonnage, keeping of troops or warships in
peacetime, entrance into agreements or compacts with other states or foreign countries or
engaging in war without Congress' consent, "unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONsT. art I. § 10, cl. 3.
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tion itself was that the States may need to impose an embargo in time
of scarcity precipitated by war, if Congress has not had time to act.
122
However, such a contingency would rarely occur in an age when Con-
gress sits virtually year-round. This factor, when combined with the
affirmative restrictions that did end up in the Constitution' 13 and the
long-standing prohibition against interstate embargoes enforced
through the application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 24
militate against allowing subnational entities such sweeping powers.
Moreover, despite the lack of any congressional action that has
yet become law, parallel measures are under consideration;'" meas-
ures that, if they become law, might by implication foreclose "comple-
mentary" state and local sanctions d la Davidowitz. 26 Furthermore,
the state and local sanctions are being passed against a backdrop of
continued debate between the executive branch and Congress as to
the appropriateness and efficacy of unilateral sanctions, 27 and in the
122. See 2 REcoRDs, supra note 121, at 440-41:
Mr. Madison moved to insert after the word "reprisal" (art. XII) the words "nor
lay embargoes." He urged that such acts [by the States] would be unnecessary-
impolitic-& unjust-
Mr. Sherman thought the States ought to retain this power in order to pre-
vent suffering & injury to their poor.
Col. Mason thought the amendment would be not only improper but danger-
ous, as the Geni. Legislature would not sit constantly and therefore could not
interpose at the necessary moments- He enforced his objection by appealing to
the necessity of sudden embargoes during the war, to prevent exports, particu-
larly in the case of a blockade-
Mr[.] Govr. Morris considered the provision as unnecessary; the power of




See also NOwAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 57, § 8.9, at 282-83 (discussing generally
the prohibitions against the interstate impositions of embargoes).
123. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) and cases discussed
therein.
125. See, e.g., S. 2102, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3890, 105th Cong. (1998) (pending leg-
islation providing for sanctions against the Nigerian government). Cf. Omnibus Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166, 3009-167 (1996)
(imposing a fairly narrow range of sanctions on Myanmar regime), and Price & Hannah,
supra note 12, at 452-53.
126. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. But see supra note 81 (discussing
Supreme Court's recent reluctance to imply preemption).
127. It is also somewhat ironic that subnational-level sanctions are blossoming at a time
when unilateral federal sanctions are themselves being increasingly subjected to criticism
from various commentators, including the President and members of the House and Sen-
ate. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Backs Off Sanctions, Seeing Poor Effect Abroad, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 1998, at A6. In 1997, the President's Export Council reported that 75 nations,
"home to more than 50% of the world's people," were already subject to unilateral U.S.
face of various public objections and the objections of the State De-
sanctions: "Included were not just traditional pariah states like Iraq, Libya and Burma
[Myanmar], but such NATO allies as Canada and Italy as well as Japan .... ." The Negative
Cost of Sanctions, L.A. Tmras, May 22, 1998, at B-8. U.S. exports to all such sanctioned
countries approximated $94 billion in 1996, but with a concomitant loss of some 250,000
U.S. jobs attributed to the imposition of such sanctions. See id.
While unilateral sanctions have begun to meet criticism from a variety of sources be-
sides trade groups and members of Congress, President Clinton admitted in April 1998 that
automatic unilateral sanctions laws at the federal level have hamstrung the executive
branch to such a degree that "it puts enormous pressure on whoever is in [that branch] to
fudge on evaluation of the facts of what is going on," in order to retain even a modicum of
flexibility for appropriate reactions. See, e.g., Michael Kelly, Foreign Affairs Fudge Factor,
WASH. POST, May 6, 1998, at A19. In the light of the mounting crisis over India's and
Pakistan's atomic bomb tests in late spring 1998, which occurred just weeks after the Presi-
dent's exceptionally candid admission (and which triggered mandatory unilateral sanctions
under federal nuclear non-proliferation statutes) the President's comments seemed pre-
scient. This is especially so in light of numerous further criticisms from U.S. and interna-
tional foreign policy experts to the effect that the unilateral federal sanctions imposed
against both countries did little to lessen tensions or provide a substantial deterrent to the
further development of both nations' nuclear arsenals. See, e.g., Kelly, supra at A19;
Schmitt, supra, at Al, A6; Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Argues for "Flexibility" Over Sanctions,
N.Y. Tamms, Apr. 28, 1998, at Al, A6; Albright Criticizes U.S. Sanctions, Associated Press,
June 15, 1998; Experts: India Sanctions May Fail, Associated Press, June 19, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file.
As to critiques of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of unilateral sanctions in general,
for reasons varying from the economic deficiencies of such sanctions to their harming the
"rogue" nation's own oppressed citizens (through lack of adequate medical care, as in Iraq
and Cuba), see, e.g., Daniel Schorr, Sanctions: A Primitive Tool, CmusTnAN Sc. MoNrroR,
June 19, 1998, at 15; Kenneth Rodman, Fudging Sanctions, J. CoM., June 23, 1998, at 8A;
Michael S. Lelyveld, Sanctions Only Bite With Global Teeth, J. COM., June 23, 1998, at 1A;
Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, FOREIGN AFFs., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 74; Richard N.
Haass, Sanctions Almost Never Work, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1998, at A14; and Thomas
Omestad, Addicted to Sanctions, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 15, 1998, at 30-31.
Suffice it to say that the issue of the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions far exceeds
the scope of this article. For a more comprehensive treatment of sanctions and their pros
and cons in general, see the two-volume treatise GARY CLYDE HJFBAUER, JEFFREY J.
SCHOCIT & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, ECONOMY SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1990).
See also Malan Testimony, supra note 10, at 2-4; O'Quinn, supra note 16; David A. Koplow
& Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot Linking Multilateral Disarmament and Develop-
ment Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 993 (1991) (advocating development aid as a "carrot"
in lieu of solely using sanctions as the "stick" of foreign policy).
In light of the various challenges to the efficacy of unilateral sanctions, Senator Rich-
ard Lugar and Representative Lee Hamilton have called for a bipartisan effort to reform
the federal sanctions regimes "by subjecting them to sunset reviews and cost-benefit analy-
ses" and by advocating multilateral sanctions over unilateral ones. Stephen Lamar, A
Sanctions Epidemic, WASH. TIMEs, May 26, 1998, at A19; Schorr, supra, at 15. In Novem-
ber 1997, Senator Lugar sponsored legislation, still pending at the date of this article, to
foster reform of the federal sanctions schemes. See Enhancement of Trade, Security and
Human Rights Through Sanctions Reform Act, S. 1413, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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partment.128  Instead of trying to adduce judicially-manageable
standards establishing whatever de minimis exception to the prohibi-
tion on state interference in foreign affairs that Zschernig may have
left intact, courts ought to acknowledge that "simplicity has its vir-
tues' 129 and employ a bright-line rule against state and local action.
D. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker
On November 4, 1998, a federal district court struck down Massa-
chusetts' procurement law, holding that it violated the foreign affairs
power.130 After disposing of a challenge to the plaintiffs' standing,' 3 '
the court held that (i) "the Framers' inten[ded] to vest plenary power
over foreign affairs in the federal government"; 132 (ii) that the foreign
affairs power "is not shared by the States... ";133 and (iii) that under
the court's reading of Zschernig, the Massachusetts law "is an uncon-
stitutional infringement on the federal government's power over for-
eign affairs.'
134
The court noted that Massachusetts "concedes that the statute
was enacted solely to sanction Myanmar for human rights violations
and to change Myanmar's domestic policies.' 35 It further found suffi-
cient evidence of the "disruptive impact [of the law] on foreign rela-
tions," citing amicus briefs from the European Union, Japan, and the
Association of the South East Asian Nations.'
36
The court then expressly rejected two of four arguments ad-
vanced by Massachusetts.' 37 First, the court rejected attempts by the
state to analogize its statute to other divestment and procurement
128. See supra notes 9 and 35 and accompanying text (noting State Department's oppo-
sition to proposed Maryland sanction bill against Nigeria and to state sanctions against
Switzerland).
129. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974).
130. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998).
131. See id. at 289-90.
132. Id. at 290.
133. Id. at 290 (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)).
134. Id. at 292.
135. Id. at 291.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 291-92.
Defendants argue that the Burma Law does not intrude on the federal govern-
ment's foreign affairs power because: (1) the Constitution permits certain state
actions that indirectly affect foreign affairs; (2) the Burma Law does not establish
a direct contact between the state and the Nation of Myanmar; (3) important
state interests embodied in the First and Tenth Amendments justify the statute;
and (4) as the foreign affairs' doctrine is itself "vague," the court should leave to
the legislative branch the issue of whether to invalidate the Massachusetts Burma
Law and similar state procurement statutes.
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statutes upheld by other lower courts. 38 The "Buy American" stat-
utes upheld by, for example, the Third Circuit "did not single out a
particular foreign country for particular treatment, as does the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law.' 1 39 Further, the Baltimore ordinance upheld in
Board of Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore,"' was distin-
guished on the ground that it "modified the City's own conduct, and
did not seek to influence individuals or companies in their private
commercial activities."'' The court also cited lower court decisions,
discussed above, that invalidated state actions on grounds they
usurped the federal government's role in foreign affairs. 42
To Massachusetts's argument that because there was no direct
link between the state and Myanmar, there was no violation of the
Foreign Affairs Power, the court responded that this was irrelevant,
since Zschernig examined "the substantive impact a state statute has
on foreign relations."'43 The Massachusetts statute's purpose was to
change Burma's domestic policy.' This was "an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the foreign affairs power of the federal government.
State interests, no matter how noble, do not trump the federal govern-
ment's exclusive foreign affairs power."' 45
Id at 291. The third and forth arguments were not addressed in the court's opinion. For a
response to Massachusetts' argument for judicial restraint, see infra Part IV.
138. See id at 291-92. See also supra notes 65-80 & 87-98 and infra notes 293-313 and
accompanying text (discussing various cases cited by the court and their inapplicability to
Massachusetts' and similar statutes).
139. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 292 (D. Mass 1998).
Even those statutes, Chief Judge Tauro noted in passing, are not free from all constitu-
tional questions. See id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr.
800, 802-03 (1969) (striking down California "Buy American" statute)); see also supra
notes 89-94 (discussing Bethlehem Steel).
140. 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert denied sub nom. Lubman v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
141. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
142. See id. at 292; see supra Part II.C.
143. Id
144. See id.
145. Id For the curious argument that although Chief Judge Tauro's decision in Baker
"has considerable historical support and reflects the traditional imperatives of interna-
tional relations" it should nevertheless be reversed, see Spiro, supra note 19, at 25. Profes-
sor Spiro believes that "[t]he changed dynamic of international relations" justifies
disregarding "[tihe lopsided allocation of authority [over foreign affairs] reflected [in] the
founders' views on the issue." Id. For our response to a similar assessment of the world
situation, see supra note 83. Cf Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitu-
tional?, 108 H_.kRV. L. REv. 799 (1995) (attributing the modem interchangeability of execu-
tive agreements and treaties requiring Senate ratification to a "constitutional moment"
brought about by historical exigencies that rendered the formalist mode of treaty-making
irrelevant). Professor Spiro's endorsement of the Massachusetts law is particularly inter-
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E. The Goldsmith Critique
An important recent article by Professor Jack Goldsmith strongly
criticizes the Zschernig decision and the assumption about the exclu-
sivity of the federal government's power in foreign affairs that has
grown up around that decision.146 Though we cannot fully do justice
to his nuanced argument here, we wish to highlight his critique of
Zschernig, particularly because of Baker's explicit reliance on
Zschernig. Goldsmith argues that the Supreme Court's reliance in
Zschernig on a self-executing, judicially-enforced limitation on state
actions that affect foreign relations was in fact an innovation of the
Zschernig Court and a departure from the law that had come
before.'47 In general, Professor Goldsmith questions "the widely held
view that the states have no legitimate interest in the regulation of
foreign relations, ' '1 48 and asserts that the originalist arguments for fed-
eral primacy in foreign affairs are premised on a mistaken reading of
text and history.1 49 Even if actions taken at the subnational level do
have effects on foreign relations, Goldsmith argues that fact "does
not, by itself, justify federal judicial lawmaking."' 50 Moreover, Profes-
sor Goldsmith faults commentators and scholars for clinging to what
he terms the "federal common law" of foreign affairs preemption,
even in the face of decisions like Barclays Bank, in which the Court
seems less inclined to embrace such an expansive federal power ab-
esting in light of his 1986 student note, in which he concluded that state and local sanctions
against South Africa were unconstitutional. See Spiro, supra note 2, at 850:
State and local anti-South Africa legislation demonstrates, in practical terms, the
drawbacks of allowing non-federal authorities to act on matters relating to the
nation's foreign policy. These measures represent a serious threat to the imple-
mentation of a unified and coherent federal program in the area.... Left un-
checked, state and local interference could cripple the national government's
ability to conduct foreign affairs, resulting in the sort of fractious cacaphony that a
federal entity can ill afford to project in its relations with other nations.
146. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism,
83 VA. L. REv. 1617 (1997); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incor-
poration of International Law, 111 HARv. L. Rv. 2260 (1998). Professor Harold Koh
critiqued the Bradley and Goldsmith position in Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 HARv. L. Rtv. 1824 (1998).
147. See Goldsmith, supra note 148, at 1661 ("Contrary to conventional wisdom, the
federal common law of foreign relations announced by... Zschernig marked a sharp de-
parture from prior law").
148. Id. at 1677.
149. See id. at 1641-64.
150. Id. at 1679; see also id. at 1698 ("There is little reason to think that state control
over matters not governed by enacted federal law affects U.S. foreign relations in a way
that warrants preemption.").
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sent some signal from Congress that it intends to preempt state
action.151
Professor Goldsmith's argument against Zschernig, and against
an exclusive power of the federal government over foreign affairs, is
forcefully presented, but unpersuasive. First, as explained above,152
we think that the various provisions related to foreign affairs can be
read to contain a structural or "penumbral" restriction on state ac-
tions affecting foreign affairs, even in the absence of a congressional
enactment. 53 Our interpretive method in arriving at the conclusion
should not concern Professor Goldsmith overmuch, since he accepts
as legitimate the self-executing restrictions recognized by the Supreme
Court in the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine.1 54 More-
over, Goldsmith favors using that doctrine "to redress the evils that
inhere in... [state] discrimination" against foreign commerce. 55 Fi-
nally, as we explain below, we think it is significant that the Supreme
Court's alleged retreats from the principles enunciated in Zschernig
have come about in cases involving states' exercise of their taxing
power, an indubitably concurrent power that the Court has often been
loath to narrow.
56
In any event, acceptance of Professor Goldsmith's critique of
Zschernig does not necessarily mean that the subnational sanctions
are constitutional. 57 There may be a simpler way for courts to find
these measures, such as the challenged Massachusetts statute, uncon-
stitutional. Instead of wrestling with the ambiguities of Clark and
151. Id. at 1698-1705.
152. See supra Part II.
153. On the popularity of penumbral reasoning with the Supreme Court in recent deci-
sions, see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77
B.U. L. REv. 1089 (1997).
154. See Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 1637. Professor Goldsmith does dispute the va-
lidity of the so-called "one voice" factor articulated as part of the dormant foreign Com-
merce Clause test, Le., whether an otherwise nondiscriminatory state tax or regulation is
nevertheless invalid because it prevents the federal government from speaking "with one
voice" in the articulation of national foreign affairs. See id.; see also infra Part III.B.(1)-(3).
155. Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 1689-90.
156. See infra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
157. It is not clear that Professor Goldsmith himself would approve of the subnational
sanctions. See Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 1711 (urging replacement of the Zschernig
doctrine with, inter alia, "judicial review of state activity based on impermissible purpose
or motive to conduct foreign relations" and arguing that "a motive test would likely pro-
hibit state foreign relations activities such as... political sanctions that, for many, present
the strongest case for the federal common law of foreign relations"); see also id. at 1689-90
& n.243 (remarking that even if the federal common law of foreign relations were aban-
doned, the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause would still operate to invalidate discrimina-
tory state regulations).
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Zschernig, courts might simply look at these sanctions' effects on for-
eign commerce. As we explain in the next section, the power ac-
corded to Congress over foreign commerce, and conversely, the
degree to which the States are forbidden to interfere with such com-
merce, has been frequently litigated before the Court. As a result, the
boundaries between permissible and impermissible state action are
more clearly drawn.
HI. The Foreign Commerce Clause
Besides targeting certain countries as "outlaws" and seeking to
deprive their governments and their people of the goods, services and
capital of American corporations, state and local governments passing
divestment and procurement sanctions also subject domestic corpora-
tions to an unpalatable Hobson's Choice: forego opportunities in
emerging markets overseas, 158 or lose the opportunity to bid competi-
tively for government procurement contracts. 59 This disadvantaging
of companies engaging in certain foreign commerce implicates the
Foreign Commerce Clause. 6 ° We argue in this section that state and
158. Ironically, many of the very nations of the developing world that have abysmal
democracy and human rights records may also be the nations most willing to accept U.S.
investment. Such investment can, in turn, provide potentially lucrative opportunities both
for business investment by U.S. firms and for moral encouragement of democratic princi-
ples among opposition groups. Perversely, one net result of the imposition of unilateral
sanctions can frequently be "the [removal of] a salutary U.S. influence from the local
scene." Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 189.
159. See, e.g., Marchick Testimony, supra note 9, at 3 (estimating sanctions' costs to the
U.S. economy to be $15-19 billion in unrealized exports and approximately 200,000 jobs);
Greenberger, supra note 9, at A20 ("Procurement contracts in California alone, for exam-
ple, are worth more to some U.S. companies than any business they could secure in many
countries, but they don't want to have to choose."). For the effect on American companies
in the wake of South African divestment and procurement regulations, see Spiro, supra
note 2, at 824-27.
160. The textual foreign Commerce Clause and its implicit restrictions on the States,
which we call here the "dormant" Foreign Commerce Clause doctrine, is of course inter-
twined with the more structural restriction described in Part II. The degree to which the
States are restrained depends not only on the scope of Congress' power "to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations" but also, as the Supreme Court has made clear, on the power
of the federal government generally to conduct foreign affairs. See supra notes 51-55 and
accompanying text. See also Spiro, supra note 2, at 823:
Conceptually, and in terms of the evils they address, these two doctrines are dis-
tinguishable only in that the commerce clause attack logically seems no more than
a slice of the foreign-relations pie. The basic idea behind both, in the context of
foreign commerce, is that no subdivision of the Union should be able to act inde-
pendently so as to affect adversely the whole.
Id. While he is correct to note the interrelated nature of the two arguments, we think that
Professor Spiro overstates the extent to which the Foreign Commerce Clause and foreign
relations arguments are indistinguishable. One might argue that companies may more eas-
local sanctions violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause in three
ways: (i) by discriminating against foreign commerce; (ii) by exposing
companies engaged in foreign commerce to a "virtual welter"'' of
multiple state burdens; and (iii) by hindering the ability of the United
States to speak with "one voice' 1 62 in matters of international trade.
A. The Scope of Congressional Power
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign nations ... 163 Unlike its interstate com-
merce counterpart, the scope of the so-called "Foreign" Commerce
Clause historically has been much less in dispute. From the time of
John Marshall, the Supreme Court has held that the power of Con-
gress to regulate commerce with other nations was complete, plenary,
and exclusive, and that the States had little, if any, concurrent power
in this area.
State impotence to restrain foreign trade is reflected in leading
constitutional commentators. In his influential treatise on the Consti-
tution, Justice Joseph Story regarded it as "universally admitted, that
the words [of the Foreign Commerce Clause] comprehend every spe-
cies of commercial intercourse. No sort of trade or intercourse can be
ily raise the Foreign Commerce Clause argument claims without risking the significant
problems of standing associated with a structural foreign relations argument. The sanc-
tions, moreover, affect both foreign and domestic companies more directly, as distinct from
the state laws in Davidowitz and Zschernig, which were aimed directly at foreign nationals.
Compare Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59-61 (1941) (summarizing direct effects of the
challenged Pennsylvania alien registration act on aliens) and Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 430-32 & n.1 (1941) (summarizing the Oregon statute's effects on foreign legatees,
heirs, devisees and distributees) with notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the
Massachusetts's statute's coverage of "all persons presently doing business with Myanmar"
and the expansive definitions employed therein).
There are, additionally, certain foreign affairs points implicated by sanctions that can
be structurally distinguished from a purely "foreign commerce" or international trade as-
pect; for example, to the extent that the actions of individual States, through their sanc-
tions, arguably jeopardize the ability of the nation as a whole to fulfill its rights and
obligations under international law and treaties, such an issue would be more appropri-
ately categorized as raising foreign affairs issues under Article I, section 8, clause 10 and
Article VI of the Constitution. See also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41; Lotus HENXII ,
RIcHARD CRAWF:ORD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMIT, IhTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERL.S, 137-226 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing and analyzing relationships be-
tween international law and domestic law).
The Baker court did not address the plaintiffs' Foreign Commerce argument, resting
its decision on the Foreign Affairs Power. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26
F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998).
161. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992).
162. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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carried on between this country and another, to which it does not ex-
tend.' 164 A leading contemporary treatise describes the foreign com-
merce power as "virtually unlimited.' 1 65  Louis Henkin, a noted
authority on the Constitution and foreign affairs, speculated that
"[t]he [foreign] Commerce Power... might be sufficient to support
virtually any legislation that relates to foreign intercourse, i.e., to for-
eign relations.' 1 66 These assessments are not hyperbolic: in 1927, for
example, the Court declared flatly that "Congress has complete and
paramount authority to regulate foreign commerce ... "167
Significantly, the Court on at least two separate occasions has
mentioned that Congress, in the exercise of its foreign commerce
power, is free from the restraints of federalism or those limits implicit
in the states' reserved powers, which strongly suggests that the power
is not shared concurrently with the States. Chief Justice Hughes wrote
in Board of Trustees v. United States that "[t]he principle of duality in
our system of government does not touch the authority of the Con-
gress in the regulation of foreign commerce."' 68 More recently, in Ja-
pan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, the Court noted that while "Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce may be restricted by consider-
ations of federalism and state sovereignty," the Court's decisions have
"never... suggested that Congress' power to regulate foreign com-
merce could be so limited.' '1 69 Thus, if it chose to do so, Congress
could impose a moratorium on state and local sanctions, preempting
existing state and local sanctions and preventing them from being
164. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
363 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (1833).
165. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NoWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION LAW.
SUBSTANCE_ AND PROCEDURE, § 4.2, at 358 (2d ed. 1992) ("The Constitution as originally
framed seems.., to recognize a virtually unlimited power of Congress over commerce with
foreign nations.").
166. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAmS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITrrUION 66 (2d
ed. 1996).
167. See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927).
168. 289 U.S. 48, 57 (1933).
169. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 n.13 (1979) (citing
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). The only limitations on Con-
gress' power seem to be the Export Clause, which forbids Congress from taxing goods
exported from the United States, and the Port Preference Clause, which prohibits Congress
from favoring the ports of one State over those of another State. Ronald D. Rotunda and
John E. Nowak write in their treatise on constitutional law: "It would seem clear from the
[Constitution] that the power to deal with foreign commerce was very precisely defined
and is a plenary one within only the specified restrictions set by that document [Le., the
Export and Port Preference Clauses]." 1 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 165, at 359. Of
course, the Bill of Rights would constitute additional restrictions on Congress' power.
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passed in the future. That it has not, however, does not authorize
states and municipalities to act with impunity.
B. The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause Doctrine
The logical corollary to the plenary power possessed by the fed-
eral government under the Foreign Commerce Clause is that state
power in this area is limited. 7 ° In the seminal 1824 case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[I]n regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several
States. It would be a very useless power, if it could not pass
those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign
nations, is that of the whole United States.' 7 '
In his concurrence, Marshall's colleague Justice Johnson expressed
similar sentiments. "[T]he power to regulate foreign commerce," he
wrote, "is necessarily exclusive."' 72 He continued, "[w]hatever regu-
lations foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the
Union, the general government would be held responsible for them;
and all other regulations, but those which Congress had imposed,
would be regarded by foreign nations as trespasses and violations of
national faith and comity."' 73 Just over a century later, Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes similarly reasoned that "[i]t is an essential at-
tribute of the [foreign commerce] power that it is exclusive and ple-
nary. As an exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited,
qualified, or impeded to any extent by state action."' 74
The Supreme Court has thus always held it to be "a well-accepted
rule that state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected
to a more vigorous and searching scrutiny."'75 Where matters of in-
ternational trade were concerned, Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "the
people of the United States act through a single government with uni-
170. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 469 (2d ed., 1988)
(describing "state regulation of foreign commerce" as "tightly proscribed by the negative
implications of what might be called the Foreign Commerce Clause").
171. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
172. Id. at 228 (Johnson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 228-29. See also supra note 112 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80).
174. Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48,56-57 (1933) (quoting Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 193). See also DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 333 U.S. 34, 37 (1927) ("The Congress has
complete and paramount authority to regulate foreign commerce and, by appropriate
measures, to protect the public against.., frauds. .. ."); H'NK , supra note 166, at 66
("There is room for [federal] 'police power' regulation in foreign commerce and of local
matters that affect foreign commerce and intercourse.") (footnote omitted).
175. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984).
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fled and adequate national power.' 1 76 As it has in the area of inter-
state commerce, 177 this means, at a minimum, that states are not
permitted to pursue policies with either the intent or the effect of dis-
criminating against foreign commerce or companies engaged in for-
eign commerce.
In Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,78 the Court declared that "[a] state
statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or
burdens foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, re-
gardless of the purpose with which it was passed.' 1 79 Though he dis-
sented over the issue of whether the statute did, in fact, burden
foreign commerce, Justice Stone noted that if a regulation discrimi-
nated against foreign commerce or "erect[ed] barriers to the free flow
of commerce, interstate or foreign," it would likely be invalid. 8 °
Hence, under this formulation, the presumption is that any state or
local statute so impinging on foreign commerce is constitutionally
infirm.
The Court's modem Foreign Commerce Clause case, Japan Line,
Ltd. v. Los Angeles,'8' though famous for the articulation of the "one
voice" test, 82 supplemented its previously stated tests for interstate
commerce only after deciding that the statute at issue did not discrimi-
nate against foreign commerce. 83 Despite the uncompromising lan-
guage of the Di Santo opinion, later decisions of the Court have not
176. Board of Trustees, 289 U.S. at 59.
177. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
178. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
179. Id. at 37.
180. Id. at 43-44 (Stone, J., dissenting). See also Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333
U.S. 28, 45 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting from decision to uphold Michigan civil rights
statute as applied to a ferry taking passengers to an amusement park in Canadian waters;
reasoning that the fact that foreign commerce is involved "should [alone] be enough to
prevent a state from controlling what may, or what must, move in the stream of that
commerce").
181. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
182. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
183. Under the test set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977), taxes on interstate commerce are permissible if (i) there was a substantial nexus
between the company and the taxing jurisdiction, (ii) the taxes were fairly apportioned,
(iii) the taxes did not discriminate against commerce, and (iv) the taxes were fairly related
to the services provided. Even critics of the Complete Auto test, like Justice Scalia, have
endorsed what is sometimes called the "antidiscrimination principle" that restrains states
from passing measures that discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce. See Ben-
dix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 889, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (reasoning that he would find a state statute as invalid under the Commerce Clause
"if, and only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not
required to achieve a lawful state purpose").
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forbidden all state action that affects foreign commerce. Such a prohi-
bition would no doubt have proved as unworkable as early attempts to
forbid states from regulating some aspects of interstate commerce.
The question before the Court, therefore, has been one of degree:
when does state action become a hindrance to the federal govern-
ment's ability to carry on relations with other countries?
1. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles
Though concerned primarily with taxation of foreign commerce,
Japan Line'" has become the reference point for all Foreign Com-
merce Clause questions that have arisen thereafter. At issue was an
attempt by Los Angeles County to apply a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem tax to certain containers of a Japanese corporation, whose
containers were used exclusively in foreign commerce, and which
though present in California on tax day, only resided there a short
time and only in connection with preparations for continuing on in
foreign commerce.' 85 Though the California courts had awarded a re-
fund on a different theory, the question that the Supreme Court took
up was "whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned,
based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in interna-
tional commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem prop-
erty taxation by a State.'
8 6
Los Angeles argued that state taxation of foreign commerce
should be treated no differently than taxation of interstate com-
merce. 87 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that when evaluating
state laws affecting foreign commerce, "a more extensive constitu-
tional inquiry is required."' 88 Specifically, the Court identified two
concerns that must be added to the normal interstate commerce in-
quiry: (i) whether there was an increased risk of multiple taxation and
(ii) whether the regulation inhibited the ability of the United States to
speak with "one voice" in matters of foreign affairs.'8 9
184. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
185. See id. at 446-47.
186. Id. at 444 (footnote omitted). In framing the issue before it, the Supreme Court
made it explicit that it was not deciding "questions as to the taxability of foreign-owned
instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce, or of domestically owned instrumentali-
ties engaged in foreign commerce." Id at 444 n.7.
187. See id. at 446.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 446-48. The Court in Japan Line actually borrowed the "one voice" prong
from its seminal Import-Export Clause case, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976), in which the Court scrapped tax immunity for imports still in their original pack-
ages, holding that such goods were subject to a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
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First, the Court noted that the problem of double taxation was
particularly acute "when one of the taxing entities is a foreign sover-
eign" because a court cannot demand that a foreign country fairly ap-
portion its taxes.190 In addition, "a state tax on the instrumentalities
of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where
federal uniformity is essential. Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a
matter of national concern."'191 The Court then identified several
ways national policy could be disrupted by unrestricted state taxation.
First, apportionment disputes might arise.192 Second, foreign coun-
tries may retaliate against United States commerce because of state
taxing policies.193 Third, foreign commerce may find itself subject to
multiple taxation as various states enforce their tax laws.194 The
Supreme Court concluded in Japan Line that if a state tax ran afoul of
either of the two additional requirements, even though it had other-
wise satisfied all the prongs of the Complete Auto test, 95 it would vio-
late the Commerce Clause and thus be unconstitutional. 96
2. Foreign Commerce After Japan Line, Ltd.
Four years later, the Supreme Court refined the "one voice" test
in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board.197 There the
without offending the underlying rationale of the clause. One part of that rationale, wrote
Justice Brennan, was the need for "the Federal Government [to] speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might
affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States consistently with that ex-
clusive power .... " Id. at 285-86.
190. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447.
191. Id. at 448.
192. See id. at 450-51.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See supra note 183.
196. See 441 U.S. at 451. According to the Supreme Court, Los Angeles' tax failed both
parts of the newly articulated test. First, the Court found that double taxation was almost a
certainty in this case. The corporation was Japanese, and the containers' home port was in
Japan. See id. at 451-52. "Even a slight overlapping of tax... assumes importance when
sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." lId at 456
(footnote omitted). As for the "one voice" test, the Court identified several ways in which
Los Angeles' tax impinged upon national foreign affairs prerogatives. Most importantly,
since similar containers owned by American companies were not taxed in Japan, the tax
created an "asymmetry in international taxation," id. at 453, which was inconsistent with
the desire of both the United States and Japan for "uniform treatment of containers used
exclusively in foreign commerce" as evidenced "by the Customs Conventions on Contain-
ers, which the United States and Japan have signed." Il at 452. This "asymmetry" in-
creased the risk of retaliation by Japan, which would harm the entire nation, not just
California or Los Angeles County.
197. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
Court was asked to pass on the validity of California's franchise tax as
applied to a Delaware corporation headquartered in Illinois and doing
business in California, but which had a number of foreign subsidiar-
ies.198 In the majority opinion, Justice Brennan announced that "a
state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the 'one voice'
standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left
to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive."'199
The latter test, the Court acknowledged to be "essentially a species of
pre-emption analysis;"2" the former, the Court reasoned, could only
be applied by reference to broad standards, the "most obvious" of
which would be the danger of offending trading partners and risking
retaliation.201
In a dissent joined by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Powell argued that the Court should strike down State taxes
after identifying any foreign policy issues implicated by the imposition
of the tax. The Court's balancing analysis, for Powell, represented "an
intrusion on national policy . . . that is not permitted by the
Constitution.
'20 2
In the years since Container Corp., the Supreme Court has been
extremely solicitous of state taxation schemes, even when applied to
foreign corporations 20 3 or to foreign commerce.20 4 In its latest foreign
198. Under California's method of calculating its franchise tax (which it has since aban-
doned), all of the various subsidiaries and affiliates (including those operating overseas)
were presumed to constitute a "unitary business," the total income of which was taxable,
after proper apportionment. See id. at 168 & n.5 (citing CAL. RIv. & TAx CODE ANN.
§ 25105 (West 1979)) & 181-84.
199. Id. at 194.
200. Id. See supra note 81 (discussing preemption).
201. Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. at 194.
202. Id. at 205 (Powell, J., dissenting).
203. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
204. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993); Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Rev., 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
In Wardair Canada, the Court upheld a State tax imposed on the sale of airline fuel
used in international travel. 477 U.S. at 3. In his opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that
the United States had not intended to deprive Florida of its taxing ability by being a signa-
tory to various international treaties aimed at eliminating various taxes on aviation, the
goals of which the Court termed "aspirational." Id. at 9-10. Therefore, by imposing the
tax, Florida had violated no federal directive. Id. at 6-7. As to the question whether the
tax contravened "foreign policy issues which must be left to the federal government," the
opinion is less clear. Justice Brennan framed his entire discussion in terms of whether the
tax violated a "federal policy," id. at 9, thus collapsing both the "federal directive" and
"foreign policy issues" factors of the "one voice" test back into a single standard. It made
little difference in this case because, in the Court's view, "the evidence relied upon by the
appellant and the United States not only fails to reveal any such federal policy, but...
shows also that in the context of this case we do not confront federal governmental silence
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commerce case,205 the Court upheld a California tax scheme in terms
so deferential2 6 that some commentators question whether the "one
voice" prong of Japan Line retains any vitality.2 °7 Lower court deci-
sions, applying the Japan Line criteria in light of more recent Supreme
Court cases, seem to confirm this trend towards judicial restraint, at
least in those cases involving nondiscriminatory state regulations that
affect foreign commerce, and in the absence of action by Congress.20 8
of the sort that triggers dormant Commerce Clause analysis." lId On the contrary, the
Court concluded that in the "more than 70 bilateral aviation agreements" to which the
United States was a party, "not one" required the "United States... to deny the States the
power asserted by Florida in this case." Id. at 11.
205. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
206. In Barclays Bank, the Court upheld California's peculiar method of calculating
franchise taxes. 512 U.S. at 330-31. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg applying the Japan
Line test, the Court found that the tax neither posed a substantial risk of double taxation,
nor ran afoul of the "one voice" requirement. Moreover, the Court seemed to suggest that
Congress, not the judiciary, was the institution best suited to protect its ability to speak
with "one voice." Justice Ginsburg found it significant that, in the eleven years since
Container Corp., Congress had not acted to prevent States from using the "unitary busi-
ness" method of taxation adopted by California. See id. at 323-24. Further, the Court
signaled that, unlike in its interstate dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress
did not have to indicate clearly its intent to allow the States to regulate absent congres-
sional action to prevent the Court from striking down State actions affecting foreign com-
merce: "Congress may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential' ... ; it need not convey
its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce .... " Id. at 323. Congressional inaction meant for the
Court that California was violating no "clear federal directive." Id. at 328-29. As for the
danger that foreign governments might retaliate, Justice Ginsburg remarked that such con-
cerns were simply "directed at the wrong forum." Id at 328 (footnote omitted).
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. Justice O'Connor expressed
concern that foreign corporations' "outsider" status would make them an attractive target
for taxing authorities. "Domestic taxpayers," she wrote, "have access to the political pro-
cess, at both the state and national levels, that foreign taxpayers simply do not enjoy .... It
is all too easy.., for the state legislature to fll the State's coffers at the expense of outsid-
ers." Id. at 336-37 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., 1 JEROME HELLERSTEIN & WAITER HELLERsTErN, STATE TAXATON 8-
146 (2d ed. 1993).
[The] reliance on Congressional action [in Container Corp.] in order to determine
whether the State tax violated the Federal uniformity requirement and the need
to speak with one voice saps the rule of any real significance. For if the need for
Federal uniformity and for one voice in speaking for the nation in international
trade must be established by proof of Congressional action, nothing is added to
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence by the new "one voice" test of the constitu-
tionality of state taxes on foreign commerce enunciated in Japan Line.
Id.; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 864-65 (questioning the viability of Zschernig
after Barclays Bank); Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 1699-1700 (Barclays Bank "gutted"
one-voice test of Japan Line).
208. See, e.g., Pacific N.W. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir.
1994) (upholding Washington Department of Wildlife regulations prohibiting the sale, im-
portation, possession, or transfer of certain types of "deleterious exotic wildlife" as "not a
The Court's reluctance to apply Japan Line and Container Corp. rigor-
ously in state tax cases may reflect a hesitance to restrict a state's con-
current taxing power, even where the exercise of that power touches
on foreign commerce. In general, the taxes upheld were applied even-
handedly and made no attempt to penalize foreign companies doing
business in the taxing jurisdiction or otherwise to favor domestic com-
merce over foreign. But the Court's unwillingness to create, by judi-
cial flat, a wide-ranging tax exemption for foreign commerce in the
absence of action by Congress should not be construed as an endorse-
ment of a concurrent power over foreign affairs or the regulation of
foreign commerce. This narrower reading is supported by the fact
that the Court has not replaced the Foreign Commerce Clause test
first articulated in Japan Line and amplified in Container Corp. with
another, more lenient, standard.
3. Applying a Standard of Review for Non-Tax Foreign Commerce
Clause Cases
Under a reading of Japan Line and its progeny, in order to pass
constitutional muster, a state or local non-tax measure may not (i)
discriminate against foreign commerce; (ii) present a risk of cumula-
tive burdens being placed on foreign commerce; or (iii) hinder the
federal government's efforts to speak with "one voice" on matters of
foreign trade by either violating a "clear federal directive" or by impli-
cating foreign policy issues best left to the federal government.
A court might not even reach the additional Japan Line factors
because state and local sanctions blatantly discriminate against foreign
commerce. 09 Under the Massachusetts statute, no company wishing
to do business with any part of the government of Massachusetts may
matter in which national uniformity is important" absent "reason[s] why international
commerce in these animals might be of concern to the whole nation" or how banning them
would "offend foreign nations"); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor &
Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding the imposition of certain fees on
ships traveling in foreign commerce to finance emergency response services; deeming fed-
eral oversight, as well as the power of Congress to correct egregious abuses, as sufficient to
avoid the concerns expressed in Japan Line); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388 (3d
Cir. 1987) (upholding a Delaware state law prohibiting the bulk transfer of materials be-
tween ships within Delaware's environmentally-sensitive coastal zone and refusing to re-
gard an incidental increase in the cost of doing business a constitutionally-impermissible
"burden" on foreign commerce).
209. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Templet, 700 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La.
1991) (invalidating a state statute, aimed at American-owned maquiladora plants operating
in Mexico, prohibiting the importation of hazardous wastes from outside the United
States); Goldsmith, supra note 146, at 1637, 1711 (suggesting that discrimination against
foreign commerce is constitutionally impermissible).
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have any operations whatsoever in Myanmar or any other target
country.210 Moreover, the discrimination is evident on the face of the
statute: only persons "doing business with" target countries that are
listed in the statute - which by definition includes only persons en-
gaged in foreign commerce - are subject to the sanctions. While this is
not the sort of economic protectionism so often condemned in the
interstate commerce area,2 1 1 it is discrimination,212 and the Court has
made clear that the motivation behind the discrimination is not rele-
vant when foreign commerce is involved. 1 3 Further, the fact that
state and local governments claim license to pass such laws and ordi-
nances under the market-participant exception, discussed below, indi-
cates a recognition that but for that exemption, the sanctions would
likely be condemned as unconstitutional discrimination. 14
Second, though at first glance the "multiple taxation" prong may
seem inapplicable in a non-tax setting, an analogy between subna-
tional sanctions and the Supreme Court's directive to be wary of taxes
levied by multiple jurisdictions is not inappropriate. In other non-tax
settings in the Interstate Commerce Clause area, the Court has invali-
dated certain state regulatory measures, reasoning that if all states un-
dertook to regulate the same problem, and all imposed different
requirements, an intolerable burden on interstate commerce would re-
sult.2" 5 As the Supreme Court recently stated in the interstate com-
merce context:
[T]he practical effect of [a] statute must be evaluated not only
by considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by
considering how the challenged statute may interact with the le-
gitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect
would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar
legislation.216
210. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 183.
212. As one definition puts it, discrimination is the "failure to treat all persons equally
where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not fa-
vored." BLAcK's LAW DIcroN~ARY 420 (5th ed. 1979).
213. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
214. See Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 183 & n.24 (noting that many meas-
ures passed by cities included language invoking the protection of the market-participant
doctrine). See also notes 223-72 infra and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). For
an application of the multiple state burdens doctrines in another non-tax area, see Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and "Virtual Welters": A Note on the Commerce Clause
Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. Rnv. 535 (1996).
216. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
Such considerations are particularly appropriate, in the case of sanc-
tions, since many state and local governments have passed or are con-
sidering legislation similar to that enacted in Massachusetts. The risk
of multiple burdens imposed on foreign commerce by allowing states
and local governments to, in effect, pursue separate foreign policies is
no mere exercise in speculation. According to one count, sanctions
have been enacted or proposed in nearly forty different states, coun-
ties, and municipalities.217 A socially-conscious company doing busi-
ness across the nation, and wishing to remain eligible for government
contracts, might find its opportunities to do business overseas dimin-
ished as more subnational governments add countries to their restric-
tive purchase lists. Moreover, compliance with state and local
sanctions does not guarantee that the state or local contracts for which
it may bid will be awarded to it. Nevertheless, a corporations must,
even to be eligible, demonstrate its intention not to do business, di-
rectly or indirectly, with the target nations.218
Finally, these sanctions hinder the federal government's ability to
speak with one voice on matters of international trade and foreign
relations in general. True, Congress has yet to speak to the issue, so
states and municipalities are not in violation of a "clear federal direc-
tive, '2 19 but the sanctions are aimed at matters best left to the discre-
217. See USA*ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Watch List, supra note 6.
218. But see Blustein, supra note 7, at D2 (citing an analyst with one investment firm
that invests only in socially responsible companies as saying: "The real threat to effective
foreign policy is not the 50 states. It's the Fortune 500.").
219. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. In this regard, however, the situation
here is different than with the South Africa sanctions, some of which may have been im-
plicitly authorized by Congress. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5061 & 5091(c) (West 1990) (providing
for certain anti-apartheid sanctions), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-149, § 4(a)(1), 107 Stat.
1504 (1993) as implemented by Exec. Order No. 12,769, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,855 (1991) re-
printed in 22 U.S.C.A. § 5061 (West Supp. 1998). But see Board of Trustees v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 740-49 (Md. 1989) (upholding anti-apartheid di-
vestment ordinances; determining that local ordinances were neither preempted by federal
law, including federal anti-apartheid statutes, nor impermissibly intruded into the federal
government's foreign policy authority), cert. denied sub nom. Lubman v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990). Several commentators have therefore con-
cluded that, based on the logic of such the Maryland Court of Appeals in Board of Trust-
ees, state and local sanctions similar to the ones currently at issue should likewise be
insulated from challenge. See, e.g., Jubinsky, supra note 4, at 559; Lewis, supra note 2, at
513-15 (reasoning that "divestment statutes ought to be outside the Zschernig doctrine, as
a matter of policy"); Bilder, supra note 24, at 830-31 (guardedly concluding that subna-
tional anti-apartheid and procurement sanctions are constitutional, but noting that they
"approach the 'forbidden line"'); and TRIE, supra note 170, at 469. Not all commenta-
tors, however, have agreed that state and local sanctions would face smooth sailing in the
sea of constitutionality. See Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 498; Schmahmann & Finch,
supra note 15, at 183; see also Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1365
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tion of Congress and, under the direction of the President, the State
Department. The legislative and executive branches are the ones
charged by the Constitution with the conduct of foreign affairs and the
regulation of foreign commerce; they should be allowed to fashion a
unified, unambiguous policy toward the countries of the world without
risking embarrassment or affront to foreign countries as a result of
sanctions imposed by subnational governments. Though countries
might not retaliate or take offense, they are free to do so,220 with un-
certain and indeterminate harm to the United States' interests abroad
not readily apparent either to the state and local governments that
enacted the sanctions or to the courts asked to uphold them. The abil-
ity of fifty or more (if one counts the municipalities devising sanctions
ordinances) fragmented "Secretaries of State," each ultimately an-
swerable to a purely local constituency, to craft a unified, meaningful
response to such retaliation is dubious at best. This is especially so, if
those imposing the sanctions are not themselves the targets of retalia-
tion from the foreign countries. Simultaneously, such statutes tend to
erode the executive branch's ability to implement an effective foreign
policy and negotiate trade agreements, thus weakening federalism as a
whole.22' As one commentator has noted, "[t]he [federal] govern-
ment would no longer simply be a representative of the states, but a
referee between the states on one side and multinational corporations
and countries on the other."2 2
(D.N.M. 1980); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill.
1986); New York Times Co. v. New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 968
(N.Y. 1977).
220. As did the Swiss. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing cer-
tain retaliatory actions taken by Swiss retailers).
221. For comments on the relation of the states (and their political subdivisions) to the
conduct of foreign affairs, see Bilder, supra note 24, at 827-28; HENKIN, supra note 166, ch.
VI. See also Fenton, supra note 50, at 579 & 591 (noting the potentially damaging effects to
federalism, in the context of the "political and financial obstacles to [congressional and
court] challenges" of subnational divestment and debarment/procurement sanctions: "The
fragmentation of policy formulation enables local groups with strongly held views to obtain
local legislation unreflective of the national consensus. Broader-based or more diffuse
groups with opposing or more moderate viewpoints cannot intervene at every level. The
result is a potential distortion of U.S. foreign policy views."); Brenda S. Beerman, Com-
ment, State Involvement in the Promotion of Export Trade: Is It Time to Rethink the Con-
cept of Federalism as it Pertains to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG.
187, 200 (1995) ("Ultimately, it may be unwise to permit state and local involvement in
matters relating to foreign affairs simply because such involvement is inconsistent with the
structure of our democratic society.").
222. Spear, supra note 14 (citing Professor Robert Stumberg, director of Georgetown
University's Center for Policy Alternatives).
Ironically, this is the precise situation with which the federal government must con-
tend in the case of the World Trade Organization's dispute with the Massachusetts sanc-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SANCTIONS"
In sum, the Supreme Court's Foreign Commerce Clause test gigs
state and local sanctions with all three of its prongs. Sanctions dis-
criminate against foreign commerce by targeting specific countries
and the companies trading with them in foreign commerce, as well as
against foreign corporations of the target countries themselves. Sanc-
tions expose companies engaged in foreign commerce to multiple
state burdens that can cripple any foreign or domestic company at-
tempting to comply with regulations in every state and municipality
while conducting business overseas. Sanctions also expose the trade
of the United States as a whole to retaliation, thus rendering the
whole of the country liable for the actions of its constituent parts. Fi-
nally, by issuing sanctions, states and municipalities pretend to the ex-
ercise of powers that were not and should not be entrusted to them.
C. Should the Courts Recognize a "Market Participant" Exception to
the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause?
In the end, state and local governments will argue that the "mar-
ket-participant" doctrine frees their actions from the restraints of the
Foreign Commerce Clause.2" In his valuable treatise on constitu-
tional law, Laurence Tribe has written that while states are limited by
the Foreign Commerce Clause in their ability to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, divestment and procurement statutes might be
shielded by the "market participant" exception to the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine.224 Courts, other commentators, and state and
tions statute. States Dictate Own Foreign Policy, supra note 107, LEXIS at 2 ("The State
Department would have to defend Massachusetts before the WTO panel because individ-
ual U.S. states have no standing before the world body."). See also Marchick Testimony,
supra note 9, at 3 (regarding the federal government's role in the WTO dispute with Mas-
sachusetts); Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 445 (discussing the WTO dispute).
223. See, e.g., Oakland Ordinance, supra note 108, preamble ("WHEREAS, the United
States Supreme Court has upheld the power of a municipality to make legitimate economic
decisions without being subject to the constraints of the interstate Commerce Clause when
it participates in the market place as a corporation or a citizen as opposed to exerting its
regulatory powers....").
224. See TRIBE, supra note 170, at 469. Professor Tribe wrote:
[U]nder the Supreme Court's market participant exception to the commerce
clause, a state would be free to pass laws forbidding investment of the state's
pension funds in companies that do business with South Africa, or rules requiring
that purchases of goods and services by and for the state government be made
only from companies that have divested themselves of South African commercial
involvement.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); but see infra note 225. In a communication with
one of the authors, Professor Tribe indicated that he is rethinking this position in the forth-
coming third edition of his treatise. In the previous sentence, moreover, Professor Tribe
stated that without authorization from Congress, a state or local government that opposed
the apartheid regime then in place in South Africa could not "enact a measure denying
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local governments themselves have held up Tribe's statement as proof
that the market-participant doctrine removes any taint from their
measures.
2 2 5
This begs the question whether the market-participant doctrine
even applies to foreign commerce; there are no Supreme Court opin-
ions so holding.22 6 At least one commentator, who otherwise favors
local sanctions and believes them to be constitutional, agrees that the
South African companies the privilege of doing business within its jurisdiction; nor could a
state or locality forbid its citizens and resident corporations from investing in or trading
with multinational corporations which have affiliates or subsidiaries in South Africa." I&
(footnote omitted).
225. See Jubinsky, supra note 2, at 559 (arguing that "state legislation governing the
state's proprietary decisions are confined to operate only upon the marketplace activities
of the state itself.... [A] state enacting a [divestment statute] does not detract from the
federal government's ability to present a coherent set of regulations regarding the conduct
of foreign commerce."); Carvajal, supra note 19, at 270-74.
In all fairness to Professor Tribe, his views on procurement statutes may have been
misconstrued by commentators to confer too broad an immunity and, in any event, are
being rethought. In an e-mail to one of the authors, Professor Tribe stated that it did not
follow from the position that "a state or municipality should be free, under [the market-
participant] exception, to decline to do business itself with a given foreign nation, or to
decline to invest public funds in that nation or that nation's businesses" that "a state or
municipality enjoys unlimited freedom to engage in a kind of secondary boycott, declining
to enter into contractual relationships with anyone in turn who engages in business activi-
ties in the disfavored country." Such "remote, downstream connections are potentially
beyond that exception's reach." E-mail memorandum, Laurence H. Tribe to Brannon P.
Denning (Oct. 4, 1998) (copy on file with authors). Though this is one of the positions that
we take, see infra notes 272-278, that should not be construed as an endorsement of our
analysis by Professor Tribe, the second edition of whose treatise assumed the exception
applied to foreign commerce, a position that we question. See infra notes 272-278 and
accompanying text.
226. Given the relatively large number of cities that passed divestment requirements, it
is somewhat surprising that so few cases were actually litigated; none made it to be argued
before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Mayor & City Council of Balti-
more, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Lubman v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of Baltimore law requir-
ing retirement fund divestment of stocks of companies doing business in South Africa);
Price & Hannah, supra note 12, at 498 (noting that Board of Trustees "represents the sole
instance in which a reviewing court has affirmed the right of local governments to impose
foreign economic sanctions"); Bilder, supra note 24, at 823 n.l1 (citing additional cases).
South Africa's pariah status and the moral repugnancy of its regime in the days of
apartheid no doubt made it a client that few lawyers cared to represent.
Acknowledging Massachusetts' invocation of the market-participant exception as a
defense to the plaintiffs' charge the state's law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause, the
Massachusetts district court in Baker noted that "neither the Supreme Court nor the First
Circuit has addressed the issue." National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d
287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "SANCTIONS"
market-participant exception has no application in the area of foreign
commerce.
227
In this section we argue that the market-participant exception
should not apply to subnational sanctions. Specifically, we argue that
(i) the Supreme Court has expressed hesitance to apply the exception
to situations involving foreign commerce, suggesting that the exemp-
tion is not transferable between interstate and foreign commerce; (ii)
the rationale for the exemption, as expressed by the Court and leading
commentators, does not support the immunization of state and local
sanctions from judicial scrutiny; (iii) even if the market-participant ex-
emption were applied, the state and local sanctions are a "primeval
governmental activity" more akin to taxation than to ordinary partici-
pation in a market; and (iv) under the Court's own precedents, the
breadth of some of the sanctions would render them ineligible for the
exemption because of their impermissible "downstream regulation" of
companies' contracts with third parties having no contact whatsoever
with the city or state.
1. The Market-Participant Exception
a. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.
First recognized by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp.,228 the market-participant exception suspends the opera-
tion of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine when (i) a govern-
mental entity contracts for goods or services in the marketplace as a
"purchaser," as opposed to a "regulator;" and (ii) imposes terms as a
condition of participation that would discriminate against or imper-
missibly burden interstate commerce, if imposed by the entity as a
"regulator."229
227. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 481 ("In one sense, divestment statutes fit snugly into
the market participant niche that the Court has provided; however, the doctrine is ulti-
mately inhospitable because a great part of the statutes' effects fall on foreign commerce.")
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 477.
228. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Supreme Court had previously summarily affirmed a
case arising in a Florida district court in which a publisher challenged a Florida statute
mandating that all publishing done for the state of Florida be done in Florida. American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972)
(mem.). Rejecting the plaintiff's dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the district court
reasoned that while "[t]rade regulations are clearly subject to Commerce Clause restric-
tions,.., statutes that merely specify the conditions of state purchases are not." Id. at 725.
For citations to similar cases from states upholding similar state laws, see id. at 724 n.29.
229. See generally BoRis I. BrIrKER, BrrrKER ON Tim REGULATION OF INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §§ 7.01-7.07 (1999); NOwAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note
57, § 8.9, at 283-86; 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 167, at 47-51; TMRBE, supra note 170,
at 430-34; Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant
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In Alexandria Scrap, the Court upheld a Maryland statute that
used a combination of fines and bounties to encourage the efficient
processing of abandoned cars into scrap and whose provisions favored
in-state scrap dealers. Analogizing the Maryland scheme to a direct
subsidy of an industry by the State, and distinguishing it from laws the
Court had invalidated as violations of the Commerce Clause, the
Court upheld the law. In so doing, the Court declared that
Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to reg-
ulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has
entered into the market itself to bid up their price. There has
been an impact upon the interstate flow of hulks only because
... Maryland effectively has made it more lucrative for unli-
censed suppliers to dispose of their hulks in Maryland rather
than take them outside the State.230
Justice Powell concluded that the purposes behind the Commerce
Clause do not "prohibit[ ] a State, in the absence of congressional ac-
tion, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor
its own citizens over others."
23 1
b. Applying the Exception
Three years after Alexandria Scrap, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the
Court decided that the State could "favor its own citizens" by giving
preference to them over out-of-state citizens who sought to purchase
cement from a cement plant owned and operated by the State. 3 The
plant was built in the 1920s to supply state cement needs.233 Due to
Commerce Clause, 88 MIcI. L. REv. 395 (1989); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State Proprie-
tary Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century Anom-
aly, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 76-77; John L. Brownlee, The Market Participant Doctrine:
Ammunition for the War on Trash, 17 WM. & MARY J. ENv'L. L. 59 (1992); Mark P.
Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1097 (1988); Karl Manheim,
New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 559 (1990); A.
Dan Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980s. Scal-
ing America's Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REv. 111, 133 (1983); Michael Wells &
Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66
VA. L. REv. 1073, 1134 (1980); Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give 'Em Enough Rope: States,
Subdivisions and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U.
Cm. L. REv. 615 (1993); Greer L. Phillips, Comment, Commerce Clause Immunity for State
Proprietary Activity: Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 4 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 365 (1981); Richard
H. Seamon, Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis-
Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 DuKE L.J. 697; Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Note, South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke: The Commerce Clause and the Market Participant
Doctrine, 15 ENvTL. L. 593 (1985).
230. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 806 (footnote omitted).
231. Id. at 810.
232. 447 U.S. 429 (1979).
233. Id. at 430-31.
overproduction, the plant began to sell its surplus to out-of-state pur-
chasers.23 4 When a production slow-down resulted in an inability to
supply all of its customers, the state commission charged with oversee-
ing the plant's operation announced a policy recommitting the plant to
supply the needs of in-state users first and then selling any surplus to
out-of-state purchasers on a first-come, first-served basis."
Despite the fact that the out-of-state petitioner had come to rely
on cement from the plant and was unable to find a replacement sup-
plier, the Court, applying the reasoning of Alexandria Scrap, upheld
the commission's policy.23 6 In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun
characterized the basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap "be-
tween States as market participants and States as market regulators"
as making "good sense and sound law."237
The Court claimed that accepting the petitioner's contention that
once the State elected to become part of the market, it could not with-
draw, "would interfere significantly with a State's ability to structure
relationships exclusively with its own citizens. . . . [and would]
threaten the future fashioning of effective and creative programs for
solving local problems and distributing government largesse .... "238
To the petitioner's charge that the Commission's policy amounted to
protectionism, the Court responded that the "State's refusal to sell to
buyers other than South Dakotans [was] 'protectionist' only in the
sense that it limit[ed] benefits generated by a state program to those
who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to
serve."
239
The Court also noted that South Dakota had neither limited ac-
cess to the State's cement market, nor to the materials necessary to
produce cement, nor did the State possess "unique access to the
materials needed to produce cement" so as to create a tacit monopo-
listic situation.240 Further, the Court remarked that South Dakota had
not attempted to restrict out-of-state sales of cement purchased from
its plant. Had it done so, the result would be "a greater measure of
234. ILd. at 432.
235. Id at 432-33.
236. Id. at 446-47.
237. Id. at 436.
238. I& at 441.
239. 1l at 442. This doctrine that the State may limit benefits to its citizens is well-
established in Supreme Court precedent. Cf McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1876)
(holding that a Virginia law against "planting oysters" in the waters commonly owned by
the State of Virginia violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of the Constitution).
240. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444.
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protectionism and stifling of interstate commerce than the challenged
system allows."24
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employees, the
Court upheld an executive order from the Mayor of Boston directing
that all construction projects funded in whole or in part by the city or
funds that the city had authorization to administer should be per-
formed by firms whose crews were composed of at least fifty percent
Boston residents.242 The Court's opinion, authored this time by then-
Justice Rehnquist, characterized Alexandria Scrap and Reeves as
"stand[ing] for the proposition that when a state or local government
enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of
the Commerce Clause."'243 The Court was untroubled by the prospect
that the executive order reached beyond the privity of contract with
the contractors to affect the latters' contracts with their subcontrac-
tors.' 4 Justice Rehnquist wrote that it was permissible because, at
least in an informal sense, everyone affected by the mayor's order was
"working for the city.""24
241. Id. at 445. Interestingly, Justice Powell, the author of the Alexandria Scrap deci-
sion, dissented in Reeves. South Dakota's policy "represent[ed] precisely the kind of eco-
nomic protectionism that the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent." Id. at 447
(Powell, J., dissenting). The question for Powell was "whether the Commission's policy
should be treated like state regulation of private parties or like the marketing policy of a
private business." Id. at 449. Powell would have held the Commerce Clause inapplicable if
the area in which the State involves itself involves "traditional governmental functions;" id.
(quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). However, if the "the State
enters into the private market and operates a commercial enterprise for the advantage of
its private citizens, it may not evade the constitutional policy against economic Balkaniza-
tion." Id. at 449-50. Justice Powell then expressed doubt that a State could ever be consid-
ered truly analogous to a private market participant. "[P]recisely because South Dakota is
a State, it cannot be presumed to behave like" a regular private enterprise. Id. at 450.
242. 460 U.S. 204, 205-06 (1983).
243. Id. at 208.
244. See id. at 211 n.7.
245. Id. Though White seems to allow substantial flexibility for state and local govern-
ments as it does extend the protection of the market-participant exception to conditions
the City of Boston chose to impose on the workers with whom it was not directly in privity
of contract, Justice Rehnquist's reasoning has not gone without criticism. Professor
Coenen writes:
Then-Justice Rehnquist... brushed aside the attack on the Boston rule by assert-
ing in effect that the case did not involve a downstream restraint at all. Rather, it
was the majority's view that "[e]veryone affected by the order is, in a substantial
if informal sense, 'working for the city."' This analysis is puzzling. Construction
workers, after all, work for construction companies.... To say that construction
workers "work for the city" thus seems to blink at reality.
Coenen, supra note 229, at 466-67; see also id at 467 n.412 (quoting other criticisms of
Justice Rehnquist's characterization). Professor Coenen speculates that, in light of later
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2. The Limits of the Exception
Following White, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases in
which it limited the application of market-participant exception.246
The Court has invalidated restrictions whose effects extend far beyond
the market in which the subnational government is participating. It
has also questioned the exception's applicability to foreign commerce.
Finally, the Court has refused to apply it to actions that are "primeval
governmental activities" inconsistent with the premise of the excep-
tion, viz., that the government is merely acting in a market as a nor-
mal purchaser or seller of goods and services.24 7
a. Regulation Outside the Relevant Market
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,241 de-
cided in 1984, the Court made clear that the power to impose restric-
tions on those other than the immediate parties to the contract was
not unlimited. In return for selling some of state-owned timber below
cost, Alaska required that before the timber could be shipped from
the state, "[p]rimary manufacturing" be done in the State of
Alaska.249 This regulation was intended to protect existing industries,
provide revenue for the State, and encourage the establishment of
new industries. 0
The Supreme Court invalidated the restrictions, finding that the
condition was not authorized by Congress, and holding that by impos-
ing the local-processing condition, Alaska was acting as a market reg-
ulator, not a market participant.251 Lacking congressional approval,
the two issues left were "(1) whether... Alaska's requirement is per-
missible because Alaska is acting as a market participant, rather than
as a market regulator; and, (2) if not, whether the local-processing
requirement is forbidden by the Commerce Clause.
''25 2
As to the first question, Justice White distinguished White on the
"crucial" ground that the contractors and their subcontractors in that
cases, White could be restricted "essentially to cases involving hiring by construction con-
tractors." Id. at 468.
246. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (1997); New
Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
247. See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
248. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
249. See id. at 84.
250. Id at 85.
251. See id. at 87-93.
252. Id. at 87.
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case were, in a sense, "working for the city. '' 2 3 The same could not be
said of the relationship between South-Central Timber as purchaser
and the State of Alaska as seller of timber. There was not even a
colorable indirect relationship between the ultimate purchasers of the
timber and the State, of the sort present among the City of Boston,
the contractors, and subcontractors in White.254 Further, unlike in Al-
exandria Scrap, there was no subsidy of an existing market. "[W]hen
Maryland became involved in the scrap market, it was a purchaser of
scrap; Alaska on the other hand, participates in the timber market,
but imposes conditions downstream in the timber-processing mar-
ket." 5 Similarly, the Court noted that while it supported the general
proposition that a state, as a market participant, was free to exercise
its discretion in deciding with whom it would deal, "it did not - and
did not purport to - sanction the imposition of any terms that the
State might desire." 6 Concluding that the State "is more than a
seller of timber," the Supreme Court reasoned:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it al-
lows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market
in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further. The
State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation,
or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of
that particular market." 7
These conditions, the Court felt, "restrict[ed] the post-purchase activ-
ity of the purchaser, rather than merely the purchasing activity.""2
253. Id. at 95.
254. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7
(1983); supra note 244 and accompanying text.
255. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. at 95.
256. Id. at 96.
257. Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
258. Id. at 99. A student commentator favoring subnational sanctions firmly believes
that the market-participant exception allows subnational sanctions, but in discussing South-
Central Timber, see Carvajal, supra note 21, at 273 & n.98, the author (i) fails to note the
heightened scrutiny for foreign commerce to which the Supreme Court subjects the re-
quirement; (ii) does not acknowledge that the Court has never stated affirmatively that the
exception even applies in foreign commerce cases; and (iii) fails to offer an explanation
why broad subnational sanctions, like Massachusetts' statute, do not merely impose the
same impermissible downstream regulations that were invalidated in South-Central Tim-
ber. More generally, the Comment fails to answer the objections that the purposes of the
market-participant exception are not served by such sanctions. See infra notes 268-271 and
accompanying text.
b. Foreign Commerce
Of particular importance to the Court in South-Central Timber
was the fact that "foreign commerce is burdened by the restriction"2 9
- South-Central Timber shipped nearly all of its lumber to Japan.
260
The Court recited the "well accepted rule that state restrictions
burdening foreign commerce are subject to a more rigorous and
searching scrutiny,"26 and refused to apply the market-participant ex-
ception to Alaska's local processing requirement. Though it did not
explicitly say so, the Court seemed concerned that allowing states -
even those ostensibly acting as mere participants in a particular mar-
ket - to take actions that discriminated against or burdened foreign
commerce, would jeopardize "the efficient execution of the Nation's
foreign policy" that demands the federal government "speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments."'262
c. "Primeval Governmental Activities"
In later cases, the Supreme Court refused to apply the market-
participant exception where a state had enacted a tax that discrimi-
nates against out-of-state interests, even if the tax was intended to
function as the equivalent of a cash subsidy.263 Taxation, the Court
has held, is a "primeval governmental activity" and is inconsistent
with the claim that a governmental entity is functioning as a mere
market participant.2 4
The Court also declined to allow the State of Wisconsin to claim
immunity under the market-participant exception for a law barring
state procurement from firms having been cited for three or more vio-
lations of the National Labor Relations Act in a five-year period, re-
gardless of whether those violations occurred within or without the
State.265 Wisconsin maintained that its law escaped preemption under
the National Labor Relations Act "because it is an exercise of the
259. South-Central Uimber Dev., Inc., 467 U.S. at 100.
260. Id. at 96. The other two unique factors were that the case involved natural re-
sources, and, unlike Reeves, the goods could not leave the state unless they were subjected
to primary manufacturing requirements.
261. Id at 100.
262. Id (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1979)).
263. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 117 S.Ct. 1590 (1997); New En-
ergy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
264. See infra notes 279-283 and accompanying text.
265. See Wisconsin Dep't Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 283-84 (1986).
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State's spending power rather than its regulatory power. '2 66 The
Court disagreed, stating that "by flatly prohibiting state purchases
from repeat labor law violators Wisconsin 'simply is not functioning as
a private purchaser of services' .... for all practical purposes, Wiscon-
sin's debarment scheme is tantamount to regulation.
267
3. The Rationale for the Market-Participant Doctrine
Though a completely coherent rationale for the market-partici-
pant exception has been somewhat elusive,268 Professor Dan Coenen
has offered a test of sorts in his leading article on the doctrine that he
derived from Justice Blackmun's defense of the exemption in Reeves
v. Stake.26 9 Professor Coenen writes that
[t]o decide market-participation cases... courts must consider
whether the challenged program does or does not bring into
play the policies underlying the market-participant rule. In par-
ticular, they must consider:
(1) whether the program reflects an effort of local citizens
to reap where they have sown;
(2) whether invalidation of the program is consistent with
the underlying values of federalism, including the particular val-
266. Id. at 287.
267. Id. at 289 (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't Indus., Labor & Human Rela-
tions, 750 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1984)).
268. Though the Court has repeatedly endorsed the market-participant exception in
principle, its members have differed almost regularly as to either a rationale for it or its
application. Justice Powell, who wrote the opinion in Alexandria Scrap, dissented in
Reeves and South-Central Timber. Justice Blackmun, who authored the Reeves opinion,
himself dissented in White. On the other hand, Justice White, who dissented in Alexandria
Scrap and White, authored the Court's opinion in South-Central Timber, where the Court
accepted the market-participation exception in theory, though it declined to apply it. Not
surprisingly, perhaps, Justice Rehnquist, who authored the White opinion, dissented from
the Court's holding in South-Central Timber.
269. See Coenen, supra note 229, at 441.
In Reeves, Justice Blackmun offered the following arguments in support of the market-
participant exemption. First, according to his reading of the Commerce Clause's history,
"[t]here is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves
to operate freely in the free market." Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1979).
Second, "considerations of state sovereignty counsel restraint." Id. at 438. Third, recogniz-
ing the "right of the trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal,"
Blackmun argued that "[e]venhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States
should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent
limits of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 438 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Justice Blackmun rea-
soned that traditional Commerce Clause analysis was inadequate to "assess" the "subtle,
complex, [and] politically charged" circumstances accompanying "cases involving state
proprietary action." Id.
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ues of local experimentation and optimal responsiveness to local
concerns;
(3) to what extent the program threatens the underlying
commerce clause values of a free market and unified nation; and
(4) whether the state bears the appearance of "participating
in," rather than "regulating," the market. 7 °
Other commentators have articulated a rationale using similar lan-
guage.271 The common theme is that states should be able to reserve
state largesse for the benefit of their citizens; the best of the market-
participant cases bear this out, whether it is scrap cars in Maryland or
cement in South Dakota. It is best applied in situations in which (i)
the state or local government is benefiting its citizens; (ii) it is truly
"participating" in a particular market; (iii) its actions are consistent
with the structure of government under the Constitution; and (iv) the
actions do not unnecessarily interfere with other important constitu-
tional values.
The Inapplicability of the Market-Participant Doctrine to State and
Local Sanctions
The states' confidence in the Court's market-participation doc-
trine to redeem statutes that otherwise impermissibly discriminate
against foreign commerce is misplaced. Subnational sanctions are not
consistent with the underlying philosolhy of the exception. Even if
applied to foreign commerce, sanctions like the Massachusetts law
struck down in Baker represent attempts at market regulation, not
market participation. Finally, these sanctions reach too broadly, im-
posing restrictions on parties outside the markets in which the subna-
tional governments claim to be participating.
a. Application of the Exception in the Area of Foreign Commerce is
Inconsistent with the Animating Purposes of the Exception.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly declared that the market-
participant exception even applies to foreign commerce, and has
strongly suggested that the exception may be limited in the realm of
foreign commerce.272 It could, consistent with its case law and the
doctrine's underlying rationale, simply decline to apply it in a foreign
commerce context.
270. Coenen, supra note 229, at 441 (footnote omitted).
271. See, e.g., BrrrKER, supra note 229, § 7.07 at 7-29 to 7-30; NowAx, ROTUNDA &
YOUNG, supra note 57, § 8.9, at 283-86; TRIBE, supra note 170, at 430-34.
272. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96 (1984); Reeves,
447 U.S. at 438 n.9. See also Spiro, supra note 2, at 839.
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The rationale behind the market-participant doctrine presumes
that a state is acting in the market as an ordinary buyer and wishes to
benefit its own citizens. To paraphrase Professor Coenen, it allows
state citizens to "reap where they have sown." 273 With sanctions
though, there are no tangible benefits that accrue to the citizens of the
State. It is not as if, through the imposition of sanctions, Massachu-
setts seeks to secure a significant amount of state business for its own
citizens.274 In fact, to the extent that a corporation is a "citizen" of its
state of incorporation, that state's sanctions may work to the detri-
ment of the corporation, as well as any local employees and share-
holders, by putting it at a competitive disadvantage with other
international corporations that face no such burdens on their overseas
activities. Moreover, even under the dubious proposition that states
may participate in the market as a valid exercise of their police
power,275 the only benefit to Massachusetts' citizens' "health, safety
and welfare" is perhaps peace of mind - a psychic subsidy? a Karmic
subsidy? a "reputational benefits" subsidy? - that none of their tax
dollars are going to the coffers of corporations who may directly or
indirectly provide goods or services to countries with whose govern-
ments a majority of legislators disagree.276 The intended beneficiaries
are, in truth, manifestly not the citizens of the affected state or city,
but the people of the target countries who suffer under that govern-
273. See Coenen, supra note 229, at 423.
274. Cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204, 213-14
(1983) (noting that the program being challenged "sounds a harmonious note" with federal
policy by "encouraging economic revitalization, including improved opportunities for the
poor, minorities and unemployed" and concluding that, under such circumstances, such
"parochial favoritism" did not violate the strictures of the Commerce Clause).
275. The exercise of which is, of course, wholly at odds with the notion that the state is
acting as a market participant and not as a market regulator in the first place. See supra
note 174 and infra note 282 and accompanying text.
276. Many sanctions ordinances contain this sort of psychic subsidy language. Berke-
ley, California's procurement ordinance barring dealings with companies connected with
Burma (Myanmar) declares in its preamble that its citizens' "quality of life" suffers "when
peace and justice are not fully present in the world.. ." BERKELEY, CAL., REsOLUtnON
No. 57,881-N.S. (1995) quoted in Schmahmann & Finch, supra note 15, at 197 & n.104. See
also id. nn.104-06 (noting similar language in San Francisco, California's and Takoma Park,
Maryland's sanctions ordinances).
By and large, the anti-apartheid statutes and ordinances were premised on three gen-
eral rationales: (i) that continued investment in South Africa was contrary to a state's or
city's own commitment to racial equality as grounded in its statutes or charter; (ii) that
"companies with South African operations are simply not good investments in light of the
[then-ongoing] political turmoil in that country;" and (iii) at last, a form of the psychic
subsidy rationale appears-that local authorities, as businesses, have the right and obliga-
tion to deal only with those whom are "morally acceptable, albeit often grounded in terms
of the market-participant exception." Spiro, supra note 2, at 822-24.
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ment's policies, not necessarily the citizens of Massachusetts, San
Francisco, or New York City. While morally laudable, these are
hardly direct "local concerns" in the way that joblessness, abandoned
cars or a cement shortage are. In fact, the Supreme Court has held in
another context that a state had no interest in the protection of out-of-
state investors through its anti-takeover legislation.277 Moreover, the
benefit derived from a psychic subsidy of a state's citizens is offset by
the potential for disruption in foreign relations to the nation's citizens
as a whole, and the fragmentation of responsibility for the conduct of
foreign affairs.27
b. State and Local Sanctions Are "Primeval Governmental Activities"
Further, in recent cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
activities like taxation are "primeval governmental activities" that are
inconsistent with the idea of a state's functioning only as a market
participant and thus, subject to more rigorous constitutional analysis
in the event of challenge.2 79 In one case, New Energy Co. v. Limbach,
the Supreme Court struck down an ethanol tax subsidy provided by a
state only to in-state producers of ethanol and those out-of-state pro-
ducers whose home states offered reciprocal tax credits.2"° Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia held that the tax violated the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and refused to apply the market-
participant exception, succinctly concluding that it "has no application
here."28' The State's action in offering the tax credit involved neither
the "purchase [nor] sale of ethanol, but [rather the] assessment and
computation of taxes - a primeval governmental activity. ' '1 2 One
277. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
278. See supra Part II.
279. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); see also Camps Newfound/
Owatonna, Inc. v. Harris, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 1606-07 (1997) ("Maine's tax exemption ... must
be viewed as action taken in the State's sovereign capacity rather than a proprietary deci-
sion to make an entry into all of the markets in which the charities function."); Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,437 n.9 (1979) ("Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigor-
ous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged") (citing Japan Line, Ltd., v. Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 434 (1979); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82, 100 (1984)).
280. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 271.
281. Id. at 277.
282. Id. See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 117 S.Ct. at 1607. Though recognizing
that a tax exemption had "the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular industry, as do
many dispositions of the tax laws," id. at 1607 (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277),
the Court concluded that the "assessment and computation of taxes [is] a primeval govern-
mental activity." Id. (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277). "A tax exemption," Jus-
tice Stevens summarized for the majority, "is not the sort of direct state involvement in the
market that falls within the market-participation doctrine." Id.
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could argue that the real activity here is not the purchase of govern-
mental goods and services, but the indirect imposition of what are im-
plicitly embargoes. And embargoes, even indirect ones, are "primeval
governmental activities," not at all like market participation.
283
c. Sanctions Impose Impermissible Downstream Restrictions
Finally, assuming arguendo that a court agreed that no apprecia-
ble differences between interstate and foreign commerce existed to
prevent the application of the market participant exception, the limits
on that exception established by the Court in South-Central Timber v.
Wunnicke284 present additional obstacles that state and local sanctions
would have a difficult time surmounting. The Supreme Court invali-
dated Alaska's local-processing rule as a condition for the purchase of
the state-owned timber because it imposed conditions "that had a sub-
stantial regulatory effect" outside the market in which that state was
participating." 5
A California district court recently struck down a part of a San
Francisco city antidiscrimination ordinance prohibiting the city from
contracting with companies that failed to offer identical benefits to
unmarried domestic partners as were offered to married couples in
any other of their nationwide operations because it imposed condi-
tions beyond the market in which the City was participating. 86 As the
court characterized the restrictions, "[o]nce a company signs a City
contract, it cannot provide discriminatory benefit packages to its em-
ployees anywhere in the United States without facing penalties im-
posed by the City . . . . [T]he City effectively regulates certain
extraterritorial practices of City contractors." 7 The city and county
defended the restrictions' scope, arguing that "the City's goal in pass-
ing the ordinance is to add a concrete requirement to its condition
that contractors not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation." 288
283. See also Wisconsin Dep't Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475
U.S. 282, 289 (1986) (holding state debarment scheme to be regulation, not participation).
284. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
285. Id. at 97.
286. See Air Transport Ass'n of America v. San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
287. Id. at 1162.
288. Id. at 1157. The ordinance applied to (i) contractors' operations within San Fran-
cisco; (ii) outside of San Francisco if work was performed on property owned or leased by
the City or on which the City had a right to occupy; (iii) where work is being done for the
City within the United States; and (iv) any of the contractors' operations within the United
States. See id. The ordinance was enforced by fines and possible debarment from doing
work for the City for a period of years. See id. at 1158.
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While acknowledging that the City of San Francisco was a market
participant, the relevant question for the district court was "whether
... the City inappropriately reaches beyond the sphere of economic
activity in which it is participating in an attempt to regulate commerce
beyond its borders."'' 8 9 The ban on offering benefits packages differ-
entiating between married couples and domestic partners anywhere in
the country, the court concluded, "encompasses much more than that
in which the City is a 'major participant' ... and the individuals af-
fected by the Ordinance could hardly be described, even informally,
as 'working for the city."- 90
Procurement statutes like that on the books in Massachusetts do
just that: impose restrictions on companies that affect that company's
operations over and above the particular market in which the state
happens to be participating as a purchaser of goods or services. Paral-
lels between San Francisco's attempt to control a contractor's conduct
outside the borders of San Francisco and the subnational sanctions are
worth noting. First, such sanctions self-consciously operate extraterri-
torially. States and municipalities seek to control conduct of corpora-
tions, their subsidiaries, and affiliates that falls not only outside the
State and the rest of the United States, but outside the country. Fur-
ther, the sanctions affect relationships that have nothing to do with the
corporation's relationship with the subnational government imposing
the sanctions; they are not, even informally, all "working for the city,"
nor does the governmental unit imposing the sanctions usually have
any relationship, as a market participant or otherwise, with the foreign
operations it seeks to regulate.
Suppose XYZ Corp., a multifaceted industrial conglomerate with
operations around the world, signs a procurement contract to supply
widgets to Massachusetts. XYZ Corp. also has a subsidiary, Burmco,
that distributes fiubber in Burma. Under Massachusetts' statute, XYZ
Corp. could not continue to supply goods to the state and control its
foreign subsidiary distributing a separate product line in another
country. To allow Massachusetts to control, through its procurement
statutes, the relationship between XYZ Corp. and Burmco (which is
in no sense "working for the [State]") allows it to regulate commerce
(i) of a market in which it is not a "major participant;" (ii) beyond its
borders and beyond those of the United States - surely a far cry from
the broad reach of even the most remote state "long-arm" jurisdic-
289. Id. at 1163.
290. Id.
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tional statute;291 and (iii) outside the relevant widget market in which
it is acting as a market participant. Such extraterritorial regulation
goes beyond what the Supreme Court has allowed, even in White. 92
5. Distinguishing the "Buy American" Statutes
Before the Supreme Court's later articulation of limits on state
powers as market participants, some courts upheld "Buy American"
statutes that forbade the purchase of foreign goods and parts when
equivalent American alternatives were available.293 In a 1977 case,
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply
Commission, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey
"Buy American" statute against, inter alia, a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge by citing the market-participant doctrine.294 "One principle to
be derived from Alexandria Scrap," the court wrote, "is that a state's
legislation with respect to its purchase of goods and materials for its
own end use, at least in the absence of federal action, is not subject to
the usual Commerce Clause restrictions."295 Despite the differences
apparent in the Supreme Court's case law between interstate and for-
eign commerce, the New Jersey court regarded as "incongruous" the
result that such differences would mean that "a Buy New Jersey
scheme would be exempt from Commerce Clause restrictions, but a
Buy American scheme would not. '296 The court concluded that it
would be "odd indeed to find that when a state becomes less parochial
and chooses in its own purchases to prefer the products of the nation,
as opposed to those of the state, its purpose becomes suspect under
the Commerce Clause" and saw "no reason to deem [this action]...
less legitimate" when such concern is manifested. 97 The New Jersey
court even went so far as to say that encouraging national commerce
was an valid exercise of the state's police power.298 Yet, as one com-
291. Cf. Markham v. Anderson, 531 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1976) (construing New York's
long-arm statute; dismissing complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under such statute).
292. See generally White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204,
206-13 (1983).
293. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C.A. § 10a-10d (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); ALA. CODE § 39-3-1
(1992 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE AN. STATE FN. & PROCuRE. §§ 17-301 to 306 (1995);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:32-1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998). See also Note, Buy-American Stat-
utes-An Assessment of Validity Under Present Law and a Recommendation for Preemp-
tion, 23 RuTGERS L.J. 137 (1991) [hereinafter Buy-American Statutes].
294. 381 A.2d 774, 789 (NJ. 1977).
295. Id. at 787.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. ("The state legislation which is so sanctioned would seems to include those acts
designed to further economic interests or other legitimate ends, such as public health and
mentator noted, "What the New Jersey court found odd is, in fact,
quite understandable: the Supreme Court's doctrine accepts New
Jersey's discrimination between a New Jersey resident and a Califor-
nian; but recognizes different factors at work when New Jersey dis-
criminates between a Californian and a Mexican."299
It is tempting to note the approval that Buy American statutes
have received in the lower courts and to construct an analogy between
them and to state and local sanctions; many advocates of an active
state and local foreign policy have succumbed to that temptation.3°°
However, there are significant differences even between Buy Ameri-
can statutes, which in any event have not been tested before the
Supreme Court, and state and local sanctions.3 ° Though the New
Jersey Supreme Court had no trouble making the leap from interstate
to foreign commerce, its rationale was built on the erroneous premise
that "[t]he power to regulate commerce among the several states is...
coextensive with [the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions]" and that Supreme Court cases "scrutinizing state regulations
affecting commerce ... seem to have made no distinction between
interstate and foreign commerce. ' 30 2 Those statements were almost
surely wrong when the New Jersey court wrote them in 1977303 and
are most certainly incorrect today in light of Japan Line. °4
Significant distinctions can also be drawn between the present
state and local sanctions and the occasionally challenged but (except-
ing the Bethlehem Steel case) largely upheld state "Buy American"
statutes.305 Unlike the present statutes, or even the anti-communist
goods ordinances of the Cold War,30 6 the Buy American statutes were
not purposefully directed at any particular country or regime but,
rather, only required that certain products or raw materials be used
welfare."). But see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct.
App. 1969) (striking down California statute flatly prohibiting foreign materials in items
purchased by the state; deemed not a legitimate state interest).
299. Lewis, supra note 2, at 476.
300. See, e.g., Jubinsky, supra note 2, at 559. But see Lewis, supra note 2, at 481.
301. For a discussion of these distinctions, see infra notes 305-13 and accompanying
text.
302. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp., 381 A.2d at 788.
303. See supra notes 170-208 and accompanying text (describing the articulation of
Supreme Court limits on state interference with foreign commerce).
304. See supra notes 184-196 and accompanying text. But see Jubinsky, supra note 4, at
561 ("[l~t appears that Japan Line did not undermine K.S.B.: foreign and interstate com-
merce may be treated a like [sic] if... the statutes do not interfere with uniform federal
regulation of commerce.").
305. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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for the applicable state's public works projects.3 °7 This is hardly the
case with the present subnational sanctions, which, with a few excep-
tions, do not include "carve-outs" for protection of the public interest
or even to reduce costs to the State. 0 8 Moreover, unlike the current
state and local sanctions,30 9 the Buy American statutes singled out no
particular business entity or vendor for special treatment based upon
a relationship it might have with a particular foreign country or re-
gime. Buy American statutes, like the New Jersey3 10 statute upheld in
the K.S.B. case,311 were generally not found to discriminate against
any country's ideology. Thus, such statutes occasioned no probing for
a "democracy quotient. '312  Other challenges along foreign policy
lines, occasionally raised under the ambit of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), were rejected, so that no undue bur-
dens on foreign policy or foreign commerce or violation of the
Supreme Court's "one voice" approach generally resulted from the
implementation of state Buy American legislation.31 3 Warts and all,
such flexible, facially neutral statutes are a far cry from the application
and consequences of today's largely inflexible and facially discrimina-
tory state and local sanctions.
IV. The Case Against Judicial Restraint
Supporters of state and local sanctions point out that even if the
measures do intrude into areas of federal primacy, it should be up to
Congress, not the courts, to offer a corrective measure.31 4 After all,
no one questions Congress' power to stop such measures tomorrow if
307. Often, with an exception in the event that public officials determined the cost to be
unreasonable or if buying American goods or services was otherwise inconsistent with the
public interest. See Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913 (3d Cir. 1990);
Buy-American Statutes, supra note 293, at 140-44.
308. See supra note 27 (noting the Massachusetts sanctions statute's humanitarian
exception).
309. See supra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
310. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:32-1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998).
311. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381
A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
312. Id. at 782-84.
313. See, e.g., id. at 782-84 and 788-89. But see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board
Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969) (striking down California's "Buy American"
statute).
314. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 26, at 831; Goldsmith, supra note 146, passim.
it wished.31 One tentative supporter of state and local initiatives has
observed:
State and local governments . . . will presumably argue, in
support of their legality, that [such measures] reflect strong and
legitimate local interests and concerns regarding the appropriate
disposition of state or local public pension and other funds; that
they have only an indirect and marginal impact on foreign rela-
tions; that they relate to concerns on which Congress, although
fully aware of these extensive state and local activities, has de-
liberately not taken preemptive action; and that, consequently,
they do not impermissibly intrude upon the federal foreign rela-
tions power. 3 1T
However, requiring restraint so that a corrective measure has to
come from Congress possibly entails shutting the barn door long after
the horses have run off. Congress is either forced to spend its time
trying to anticipate encroachments on its own and the President's
power over foreign affairs and preempt those with affirmative legisla-
tion, or it must try to "unring the bell," to react to state and local
legislation after potentially severe damage to foreign policy has al-
ready been done. The Massachusetts legislation, for example, has al-
ready been the subject of a complaint to the World Trade
Organization, before which the United States government must ap-
pear to represent the State, Massachusetts itself having no standing to
appear on its own.31 7 Moreover, detrimental to claims that a vigilant
and active Congress is the best guardian of its prerogatives, the popu-
larity and emotional appeal of state and local sanctions transcends
political parties. Liberals favor them for countries like Indonesia, My-
anmar and Nigeria, while conservatives invoke them for countries like
Cuba and China. This rare transideological popularity is premised
partly, one suspects, on the theory that doing something is preferable
to doing nothing31 8 and gives sanctions a kind of political cover that
could entrench them against legislative action, if the courts decline to
intervene.1 9
315. See supra text accompanying notes 168 & 169. But see Fenton, supra note 49, at
590-92 (advocating the need for judicial action as to the consideration of subnational sanc-
tions, due to the significant obstacles militating against congressional action).
316. Bilder, supra note 24, at 831.
317. See Marchick Testimony, supra note 9 at 3.
318. See generally Omestad, supra note 127, at 30 ("The allure of sanctions is easy to
understand: They offer a way of doing something, short of using military force, about
troublesome issues . ").
319. This temptation to sacrifice constitutional integrity to political expediency is nicely
captured by the Clinton Administration's desire to play both sides of the sanctions contro-
versy against the middle by opposing the reversal of Baker while defending Massachusetts
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As in the application of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
to interstate commerce, the question becomes who should bear the
burden of inertia, Congress or the states. We argue that judicial inval-
idation of these programs is consistent with the best understanding of
the respective roles of the state and federal governments vis-d-vis for-
eign affairs. As to possible harms to federalism, we note that argu-
ments from federalism are weaker when it comes to foreign affairs.
320
While the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation v.
United States was probably incorrect to say that responsibility for for-
eign affairs went from the Crown to the Congress formed after the
Constitution's ratification in 1789,321 it was precisely because of the
chaos produced by the divergent foreign policies of the several states
under the Articles of Confederation that centralization of foreign af-
fairs and trade was uncontroversial, even among Antifederalists. 22
Judicial silence, premised on the theory that Congress may act if
it wishes, distorts the allocation of power made by the Constitution.
We cannot be, as James Madison suggested, "one nation... in respect
to other nations"3" if state and local governments are allowed to pur-
sue what amount to independent foreign policies. Unlike in interstate
or foreign commerce, Congress' silence in the face of state and local
measures like those discussed here does not signal acquiescence, nor
can it, as those boundaries are demarcated by the structure of the
Constitution. To remain silent, moreover, allows Congress to evade
its own and the executive branch's responsibility to forge a national
foreign policy that takes into account the sometimes divergent inter-
ests of the national polity's constituent members and risks interna-
tional criticism for taking moral stands on foreign policy issues.
before the WTO. See Michael S. Lelyveld, US May Defend, Oppose State's Sanctions Law,
J. COM., Feb. 3, 1999, at 3A. But a bipartisan group of House members has filed an amicus
curiae brief in Baker supporting Massachusetts, and "[t]he White House is said to be debat-
ing whether it should pursue the Constitutional issue in a case involving a regime as unpop-
ular as that of Myanmar." Michael S. Lelyveld, 15 Lawmakers Back Massachusetts Appeal,
J. COM., Feb. 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6371552.
320. See, e.g., note 165 supra (discussing Congress's "virtually unlimited power" over
foreign commerce); note 167 supra (citing Congress's "complete and paramount authority"
over foreign commerce); note 168 supra (describing Congress's powers over foreign affairs
and commerce as "very precisely defined and ... plenary"); and Beerman, Comment,
supra note 221, at 222 ("Thus, it remains settled that Congress has the final word in regu-
lating trade with foreign nations.").
321. 249 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
322. See supra notes 51 & 56 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 1.
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Conclusion
"It is crucial to the efficient execution of the Nation's foreign policy
that 'the Federal Government... speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.' 324
Many state and local governments are enacting or are considering
procurement statutes aimed at companies that operate in or deal with
certain countries with whose policies those state and local govern-
ments disagree. By insisting that affairs of state are states' and munic-
ipalities' affairs, subnational governments have produced a sorry state
of affairs in which effective foreign policy-making at the national level
is hindered and in which allies (and potential adversaries) are left con-
fused and irritated. As a result, jobs are lost and business opportuni-
ties are squandered. Admittedly, many of the countries and regimes
against whom the latest wave of subnational sanctions are directed are
highly anti-democratic and have amassed records of substantial
human rights abuses. Such reprehensible conduct, however, does not
answer the question whether state and local governments may consti-
tutionally impose such sanctions. These are judgments that must be
made regardless of the nature of the regime against which sanctions
are enacted. These sanctions, like the statute struck down in Massa-
chusetts, are unconstitutional because they violate the allocation of
power between the state and local governments recognized in
Supreme Court cases like Davidowitz, Clark, and Zschernig, and be-
cause they constitute a violation of the implicit restrictions on a state's
power to regulate foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause.
In addition, in enacting these sanctions, subnational governments
are not "market participants," assuming (which we do not) that the
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine even applies in the foreign commerce context. Sanctions, like
embargoes and taxes, are best characterized as a "primeval govern-
mental activity," which takes such governments' actions out of the
realm of mere market participation. In any event, the current wave of
subnational-level sanctions clearly impose restrictions far beyond the
market in which the state or local government purports to be partici-
pating, and on persons who can, in no sense, be understood to be
working for the governmental unit.
If state and local governments wish to have a voice in the forma-
tion and implementation of foreign policy, they should make their
324. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc.. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984), citing
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
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views known to members of Congress and to the President,3" both of
which branches would seem to ignore the wishes of their constituents
at their peril. States and municipalities, however, should neither be
allowed to hinder both branches in the execution of their constitu-
tional duties nor to continue to function as a clamorous multitude of
de facto "Secretaries of State" on their own behalf. The continued
fragmented results of state and local sanctions may, in the end, prove
to be a collective disservice to all, leaving us all - as in the days of the
Articles of Confederation - "victims of our own imbecility," '326 a Bal-
kanized nation in the spheres of foreign affairs and commerce.
325. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D.
Mass. 1998) ("Massachusetts' concern for the welfare of the people of Myanmar as mani-
fested by this legislative enactment may well be regarded as admirable. But under the
exclusive foreign affairs doctrine, the proper forum to raise such concerns is the United
States Congress."). See also text accompanying note 110 supra.
326. I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 261, at 181 (Thomas M. Cooley, ed., 1873) (1833) (commenting on foreign policy and
foreign commerce defects of the Articles of Confederation: "We were.., the victims of our
own imbecility, and reduced to a complete subject to the commercial regulations of other
countries, notwithstanding our boasts of freedom and independence."). See also note 53
supra and accompanying text.
